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INTRODUCTION
B LACK'S Law Dictionary defines "fiduciary" as "a person having
duties involving good faith, trust, special confidence, and candor to-
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wards another .... A lawyer is... in a fiduciary relationship with the
client."'
A lawyer is always in a general fiduciary relationship with her client,
but a lawyer may serve clients in other fiduciary capacities as well. Other
capacities may include executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, and
agent. A lawyer may even serve a client solely in one of these fiduciary
capacities.2
Lawyers are particularly well suited to serve in fiduciary roles because
of their training in issue spotting and analysis, substantive law, commu-
nication, conflict resolution, and legal ethics. Furthermore, lawyers are
bound by both the ethical rules of professional conduct and state laws
governing malpractice liability. Lawyers serving as fiduciaries may also
be subject to the ethical and legal rules that govern fiduciaries.
Legal and ethical safeguards are essential to protect clients from possi-
ble ethical misconduct by lawyer/fiduciaries as well as to protect lawyers
from unjustified professional discipline and malpractice liability. The ex-
isting standards of ethical conduct (e.g., the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility ("Model Code") and Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules")) do not specifically address the ethical consid-
erations that a lawyer encounters when serving in specific fiduciary ca-
pacities. The ethical standards that regulate the professional conduct of
lawyers have, to a great extent, been developed to govern the ethical be-
havior of lawyers as zealous advocates or litigators. Nonetheless, in
many areas of legal practice, and in particular those areas that most often
affect the elderly client (such as domestic relations, estate planning, and
life and health care planning), the lawyer is frequently called upon to act
as counselor, intermediary, and fiduciary. In such roles, the lawyer often
must function without clear guidance from the profession's ethical
standards.
This Article advocates that lawyers should serve as fiduciaries in cer-
tain situations. A client may want to nominate his lawyer to a fiduciary
role because of a long-standing, close lawyer-client relationship or be-
cause the client has no one else to turn to (recognizing that the lawyer
provides the client with a trusted, competent person as well as the pros-
pect of continuity through use of the lawyer's firm). There may also be
situations when the lawyer is not well-known by the client but may still
be the appropriate person to be named as fiduciary. This may occur, for
example, when the client's assets do not meet the threshold level for a
corporate fiduciary, or when no other family member or trusted person is
available.
To allow lawyers to function as fiduciaries, there must be well-defined
safeguards for the protection of the client, the lawyer, and the legal pro-
1. Black's Law Dictionary 625 (6th ed. 1990).
2. For purposes of this Article, use of the term "fiduciary" refers to specific fiduciary
roles (e.g., trustee, guardian, and agent) that a lawyer may perform, rather than the gen-
eral fiduciary relationship between attorney and client.
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fession. Because the ethical standards now in place do not adequately
provide such safeguards, we suggest several options for better regulating
the ethical behavior of lawyers as fiduciaries.
Part I of this Article examines the development of fiduciary law and
how it intersects with the ethical standards that affect lawyers serving as
fiduciaries. Part II sets forth the public policy reasons for having lawyers
serve as fiduciaries. Part III explores the possible legal and ethical con-
siderations of the Model Rules and their application to lawyers serving as
fiduciaries. This last section is divided into three main areas: (1) the
ethical and legal consequences of a lawyer/scrivener designating herself
in a will or trust as a fiduciary for the estate or trust; (2) the ethical and
legal considerations that arise when a lawyer serves in the dual capacity
of both fiduciary and lawyer for herself as fiduciary; and (3) possible con-
flicts of interest when the lawyer serves solely as a fiduciary.
Finally, this Article concludes by suggesting clearer ethical guidelines
for lawyers who serve in numerous fiduciary roles. We do this in the
belief that, in certain situations, lawyers should be encouraged to serve as
fiduciaries, and that lawyers as fiduciaries should understand clearly the
ethical and legal parameters within which they function. The ultimate
goal is to broaden our thinking about lawyers: not only are they zealous
advocates serving the legal needs of the individual client, but they are
also trusted professionals capable of serving clients, and even groups of
clients, in many roles.3
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FIDUCIARY LAW
A. What is a Fiduciary?
A fiduciary is generally thought to be that person in whom another
person reposes trust. Austin W. Scott defined fiduciary as "a person who
undertakes to act in the interest of another person."4 Certainly, a fiduci-
ary is a person who has been entrusted with some level of power to act on
behalf of the person who has that power to entrust.
The fiduciary relationship involves an interplay of power and depen-
3. For interesting discussions of lawyers serving more than one client simultane-
ously, see Patricia M. Batt, The Family Unit as Client: A Means to Address the Ethical
Dilemmas Confronting Elder Law Attorneys, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 319, 325-31 (1992);
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 15 (1987).
4. Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 539, 540 (1949). See
also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 795, 808-09 (1983) (asserting that the
two central features of a fiduciary relationship are: 1) the fiduciary acts as a substitute
for an entrustor, and 2) the fiduciary obtains power to act in the entrustor's interests);
Robert W. Hallgring, The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act and the Basic Principles of Fidu-
ciary Responsibility, 41 Wash. L. Rev. 801, 802 (1966) (defining fiduciary relationship as
"those in which a person is entitled to repose confidence in another who has undertaken
to act in his interest"); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 Cambridge L.J. 69, 76
(1962) (defining one type of fiduciary as one who is "under an obligation.., to act on
another's behalf or for another's benefit") (footnote omitted).
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dency for the achievement of certain ends. While the person who en-
trusts power (or "trusting person") remains dependent on the fiduciary
during the course of their relationship, the trusting person nonetheless
has (or should have) the authority to define the limits of the relationship.
Within the confines of the relationship, the fiduciary is independent to
act as she sees fit, so long as she acts in the interest of the trusting person
who depends on her. The relationship may vary in intimacy, intensity,
temporal duration, and legal potential.5
B. What is Fiduciary Law?
Fiduciary relations have existed since ancient times, being well docu-
mented, for example, in biblical texts.6 Fiduciary relations typically in-
lude those of trustee/beneficiary, guardian/ward, conservator/
conservatee, principal/agent, attorney/client, partner/partner, executor/
legatee.7 While common law principles regarding fiduciaries stem pri-
marily from the law of trusts, the law has traditionally dealt with fiduci-
ary relations by applying the legal principles of the substantive areas of
law in which those relations appeared.'
Several contemporary commentators on fiduciary law suggest that this
traditional approach is inadequate both in regulating fiduciary relations
for the protection of the dependent or trusting parties, and in providing
legal and ethical guidelines to those functioning as fiduciaries.9
The regulation of fiduciary relations is difficult in part because the rela-
5. As Scott notes, "[shome fiduciary relationships are undoubtedly more intense than
others. The greater the independent authority to be exercised by the fiduciary, the
greater the scope of his fiduciary duty." Scott, supra note 4, at 541.
6. See, eg., The Parable of the Unjust Steward in Luke 16:1-13 (describing the rela-
tionship between a rich man and his steward; the steward was entrusted with the manage-
ment of certain of the rich man's goods).
7. The Uniform Probate Code, for example, provides that "'Fiduciary' includes a
personal representative, guardian, conservator and trustee." Unif. Probate Code § 1-
201(13) (1989).
8. According to one author:
Traditionally, the courts have developed fiduciary law by defining various rela-
tions as fiduciary and designing rules for these relations .... This method of
developing the law was adequate in the past because new types of fiduciaries
were recognized gradually over the centuries. The "use" emerged during the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries in England, and the trust developed over the
fourteenth through seventeenth centuries. Partnerships appeared in the six-
teenth century, and evolved into joint stock companies and corporations.
Emancipated servants and employees emerged from domestic relations law to
become agents and factors. It was therefore sufficient to describe an arrange-
ment, call it fiduciary, and decide on appropriate rules.
Frankel, supra note 4, at 804-05 (footnotes omitted).
9. For recent attempts to establish basic principles of fiduciary law, see generally
Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 285 (1989); J.C.
Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 Law Q. Rev. 51
(1981); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. Toronto LJ. 1 (1975); Fran-
kel, supra note 4; Hallgring supra note 4; Sealy, supra note 4.
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tions themselves are neither static nor easily definable.1" The nature of
the relationship may vary or be classified in a variety of ways: the rela-
tionship may be one based entirely on the entrustment of power;" on
profit making;' 2 on varying degrees of intensity and dependency; a or the
interplay of substitution and delegation.' 4
The underlying premise of fiduciary law is to protect the trusting per-
son against any abuse of position, or trust, by the fiduciary. As noted
above, judge-made law has developed by analogy, constructing rules that
have sought to prevent fiduciary abuse and over-reaching. Based in trust
law, the basic measure of a fiduciary's duty is that the fiduciary/trustee is
required to exercise only the skill and prudence that an ordinarily capa-
ble and careful person would use in the conduct of his or her own busi-
ness of a like character and with objectives similar to those of the trust.' 5
Moreover, it is the duty of the trustee to administer the trust solely in the
interests of the beneficiaries. 16 She is not permitted to place herself in a
position where it would be for her own benefit to violate a duty to the
beneficiaries.' 7
George G. Bogert and the Restatement (Second) of Trusts have also
set forth an exception to the "prudent man rule" when the trustee has
superior or specialized skills or has represented himself as possessing
such skills.'" According to Bogert and the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts:
when a trustee accepts a trust, after having emphasized . . . its ex-
traordinary abilities, or with knowledge that the settlor knows of the
trustee's extraordinary capacity .... the trustee should be held im-
pliedly to have promised the settlor that it could and would use its
powers to the maximum.' 9
Thus, the existence, or representation, of higher skill imposes a duty on
the fiduciary to exercise it.
10. An exception is in a trust situation, for example, where a written instrument spe-
cifically names the fiduciary and describes the limits of the fiduciary's duties. However,
as we shall discuss below, even in the most seemingly definite of fiduciary relations, there
may always be questions of confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and to whom specifically
the fiduciary owes her duty of loyalty.
11. See Flannigan, supra note 9, at 286-97.
12. See Weinrib, supra note 9, at 2.
13. See Scott, supra note 4, at 541.
14. See generally Frankel, supra note 4 (describing the anatomy of fiduciary relations
as consisting of substitution of roles and delegation of powers).
15. See George G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 541 (Rev. 2d ed. 1993).
16. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 (1959) ("Duty of Loyalty. (1) The
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of
the beneficiary.").
17. See Bogert, supra note 15, at § 543.
18. See Bogert, supra note 15 § 541; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 (1957).
19. Bogert, supra note 15 § 541; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 (1959). For a
discussion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's interpretation of a fiduciary's repre-
sentation of greater skill than that of the ordinary person, see generally, W. Preston
Granbery, Recent Developments, 21 Vill. L. Rev. 151 (1975).
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The fiduciary relationship is based on the concept of trust; this trust
stems primarily from a moral and ethical duty, not from a legal or con-
tractual one.20 The trusting person places his trust in another to carry
out some specific task he is not capable of performing. The entrusted
person thus wields a great deal of power. To keep the fiduciary in line
and to protect the trusting person, the fundamental principle applied to
the fiduciary relationship has been the duty of loyalty. All fiduciaries are
subject to the fiduciary principle of loyalty, but not every fiduciary will be
subject to that principle to the same extent as every other fiduciary.2"
The limits of the duty of loyalty, as well as other fiduciary duties, will be
established by the parties through their words and conduct. When a
breach of this duty occurs, judicial intervention becomes necessary.
The fiduciary relationship carries with it a great deal of risk. The
trusting person risks that the fiduciary may act in ways the trusting per-
son has not consented to, may breach the trusting person's confidential-
ity, may develop conflicts of interest, or may use the trusting person's
property to the fiduciary's own benefit. The law of fiduciaries has contin-
uously attempted to protect the trusting person from abuses of power by
the fiduciary. Moreover, fiduciary law has provided the fiduciary with
rules-if only to be applied by analogy to prototypical relations-about
what the fiduciary may or may not do with the power entrusted.
Any fiduciary is subject to potential civil liability for breach of a fiduci-
ary duty, including the duty of care, to the trusting person. Once it is
clear that a fiduciary relation exists, the question is often to what degree
has the fiduciary actually breached her duty. Yet, the extent to which
the fiduciary must adhere to the principle of loyalty remains an unsettled
area of the law.
Certainly the underlying premise of the fiduciary's duty of loyalty is
that the fiduciary must act in the trusting person's best interests. But are
the trusting person's best interests entirely separate from the interests of
third parties, as in the case of the trust's settlor and its beneficiaries? Are
the trusting person's best interests clearly understood by all the parties
potentially affected by the fiduciary's acts? Should they be? Do the du-
ties of care and loyalty adequately protect the trusting person from po-
tential abuses of power by the fiduciary?
20. This concept was expressed by Chief Judge Cardozo (later Mr. Justice Cardozo)
in a well-known opinion:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when peti-
tioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating ero-
sion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted).
21. See Scott, supra note 4, at 541.
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Tamar Frankel suggests that the goal of fiduciary law should be to
permit the parties to enter into the fiduciary relation freely and to ensure
that the fiduciary will not coerce the trusting party.22 She suggests that
the proper monitoring of individual fiduciary relations should be accom-
plished by the courts' evaluation of the fiduciary power entrusted and its
potential for abuse. Thus, the parties themselves would be free to estab-
lish the limits of power (including the limits of such essential aspects of a
fiduciary relation as confidentiality) for that particular relationship,
knowing that the courts will be there to evaluate any abuses of power
that may ensue.23
C. Lawyer as Fiduciary
Lawyers always stand in a fiduciary relationship with their clients.
This Article examines only those situations where a lawyer serves in spe-
cific fiduciary roles, such as trustee, guardian, executor, or administrator.
In these situations, the pressing questions are: (1) What is the lawyer's
liability for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty?; (2) What is the law-
yer's liability for breach of the fiduciary standard of care?; (3) How do
the rules of ethical conduct affect the lawyer when serving as fiduciary?
A lawyer serving in fiduciary roles may be governed not only by fiduci-
ary and civil malpractice law, but also by the ethical standards of the
rules of the profession. The difficulty for a lawyer functioning as fiduci-
ary is determining to what extent fiduciary law and professional stan-
dards mesh.
Just as a fiduciary will be subject to potential civil liability for breach
of fiduciary duty, the lawyer serving as a fiduciary may incur civil liabil-
ity to third persons for a breach of her fiduciary duties. Moreover, even
when a lawyer is serving solely as a fiduciary, she may still be subject to
liability for legal malpractice.
1. A Lawyer's Civil Liability to Third Persons Other Than Clients
Lawyers may be liable to beneficiaries for negligently drafting wills
and trusts for their clients. As a general rule, a lawyer is held liable in
malpractice to her client because of the contractual lawyer-client rela-
tionship. Thus, negligence on the part of the lawyer in the course of her
professional representation is insufficient to give a right of action to a
third person with whom she is not in privity.24 The majority of jurisdic-
tions, however, now hold that even in the face of no privity of contract,
lawyers may be held liable to third persons, under prescribed circum-
stances, for professional negligence.
22. See Frankel, supra note 4, at 801.
23. See id. at 836.
24. See 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 142(a) (1980); Joan Teshima, Annotation,
What Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable to Person Other than
Immediate Client, 61 A.L.R. 4th 464 (1988).
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For example, in Lucas v. Hamm,2 s the Supreme Court of California
held that the "intended beneficiaries of a will who lose their testamentary
rights because of failure of the attorney who drew the will to properly
fulfill his obligations under his contract with the testator may recover as
third-party beneficiaries. 26 In reaching its decision, the court based its
analysis on an earlier decision, Biakanja v. Irving," which abolished the
privity defense in California in malpractice cases involving estate plan-
ning.28 The Supreme Court of California, in Lucas, developed a balanc-
ing test to determine, as a matter of policy, a lawyer's liability to third
persons not in privity.29 The test's factors include: the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of
harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury, and the policy of preventing future harm. 0
While not all jurisdictions have adopted the California test, the major-
ity have assumed that the lack of contractual privity is no defense to the
lawyer/drafter.31 Thus, a lawyer faces possible civil liability to third per-
sons other than clients even though no privity of contract exists between
them where the third person is a beneficiary and the damage is foresee-
able and proximately caused by the lawyer's negligence.
The rejection of the privity rule does not necessarily extend to the law-
yer for the fiduciary. This is an area open to debate in the various juris-
dictions. In the majority of jurisdictions, the privity rule still applies to a
malpractice action by third parties against the lawyer for the fiduciary. 2
The reasoning behind this practice is that the lawyer's duty of care is
owed to the fiduciary alone.33
On the other hand, some courts have extended the privity doctrine to
establish a legal relationship between beneficiaries and a fiduciary's law-
yer: "A beneficiary whose interest in an estate is vested is in privity with
the fiduciary of the estate, and where such privity exists the attorney for
the fiduciary is not immune from liability to the vested beneficiary for
damages arising from the attorney's negligent performance. '
In Fickett v. Superior Court of Pima County,3 5 the court applied the
25. 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
26. Id. at 689.
27. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
28. See Lucas, 364 P.2d at 687.
29. See id.
30. See id,
31. For a more detailed discussion of the approaches taken by different jurisdictions,
see Bruce S. Ross, Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning and Administration, 18 ACTEC
Notes 248, 250 (1993).
32. See Ross, supra note 31, at 262. Ross also points out that the executor or trustee
who is surcharged as a result of conduct taken in reliance on counsel's advice may look to
that counsel for recompense or indemnification. See id.
33. See Saks v. Damon Raike & Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 869, 877 (Ct. App. 1992).
34. Elam v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 541 N.E.2d 616, 618 (Ohio 1989).
35. 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
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Biakanja balancing test to determine whether the court-appointed attor-
ney for the conservator would be held liable to the ward of the conserva-
tor.3 6 The court determined that "when an attorney undertakes to
represent the guardian of an incompetent, he assumes a relationship not
only with the guardian but also with the ward."37
2. Application of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are generally used only to
discipline lawyers. An area of confusion is the extent to which a court
will examine the Model Rules, or other standards of professional con-
duct, when determining whether there has been a breach of the standard
of care in a legal malpractice action. The Model Rules specifically state
in the Preamble that the Rules "are not designed to be a basis for civil
liability."38 The general rule is that a violation of the Model Rules does
not provide the basis for a civil malpractice action. Nonetheless, courts
have found violations of the Model Rules to be evidentiary as to the stan-
dard of care due a client.39 Despite disagreement and uncertainty, courts
do examine breaches of ethical rules when determining negligence, and a
breach cannot in any way be helpful to the defendant/lawyer in a mal-
practice suit.4'
This confusing situation begs the question whether a lawyer should be
subjected to professional discipline for a breach of duty occurring outside
the practice of law.41 That is, how do the ethical rules apply to a lawyer
36. See id. at 990.
37. Id.
38. Model Rules of Professional Conduct pmbl. (1992); see also, Ronald C. Link,
Developments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Administration Law-
yer: The Effect of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 26 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J.,
Spring 1991, at 1, 11 n.14 (stating that the Model Rules do not impose malpractice liabil-
ity for a breach of an ethical rule).
39. See Mirabito v. Liccardo, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 573-74 (Ct. App. 1992).
40. See Ross, supra note 31, at 266-67. According to Ross:
Despite the conflict ... it is fair to observe that, whether an ethical rule in a
given jurisdiction (1) establishes the attorney's duty of care, (2) is "some evi-
dence" of the attorney's duty, or (3) otherwise impinges on the attorney's duty,
an attorney who has breached an ethical rule in the course of representing his or
her client will have greater difficulty in establishing a defense to the client's later
action for malpractice than would be the case if no ethical violation existed.
Id. at 267.
41. The lack of specific answers to questions regarding the applicability of ethical
rules to lawyers serving in fiduciary capacities may stem, in part, from the lack of delinea-
tion between the roles of lawyer and lawyer serving in other capacities. Jeffrey N. Pennell
notes:
Other ancillary activities can generate ... ethics concern, including acting as a
fiduciary, as an investment counselor, operating an investment fund, providing
real estate brokerage or title insurance, performing investment banking services,
or acting as a paid political lobbyist. Each of these may provide a valuable
service to clients. Nevertheless, although not specifically focusing on estate
planners and their ancillary activities, the Litigation Section of the American
Bar Association has concluded that
the provision of both legal and non-legal services through a law firm may
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serving in a fiduciary capacity?4 2
According to fiduciary law, a lawyer in a fiduciary position is entrusted
to perform certain functions, by a trusting person, and is in a position of
power regarding that trusting person's dependency. The lawyer as a fi-
duciary owes a duty of loyalty. Any breach of that loyalty breaches the
fiduciary duty, provides grounds for removal, and subjects the lawyer to
possible negligence claims. Also, since a breach of fiduciary loyalty by
the lawyer serving as fiduciary would indicate that the lawyer is not com-
petent in the fiduciary role, a breach of fiduciary duty may mean a breach
of professional ethics as well.43 Just as an ethical breach can be used as
evidence in civil malpractice, a fiduciary breach by the lawyer fiduciary
compromise the independent professional judgment of lawyers, and create
conflicts of interest between lawyers and their clients.
Jeffrey N. Pennell, Professional Responsibility: Reforms are Needed to Accommodate F-
tate Planning and Family Counseling, in 25 Univ. of Miami Philip E. Heckerling Inst. on
Est. Plan. 1804.3 (John T. Gaubatz ed. 1991) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
Patricia Brosterhous points out:
Conflicts of interest and other problems relating to attorney conduct may inevi-
tably arise once an attorney actually undertakes [estate] administration....
[T]he attorney acting in another fiduciary role must rely on the Code or the
Model Rules, as the case may be, and judicial construction thereof, and of
course statutory or common law rules defining and [sic] executor's or trustee's
relationship to the trust's or estate's beneficiaries.
Patricia Brosterhous, Draft Statement of Principles Comes Not a Moment Too Soon, 127
Tr. & Est., Dec. 1988, at 12, 18. Brosterhous also notes that "the difficult question of
whether attorney malpractice is to be differentiated from trustee malfeasance, and if so
how: at what point does the attorney acting in another fiduciary role cross from legal
work into the realm of non-legal work?" Id. at 16.
William D. Haught notes that the Task Force on Attorneys Acting in Other Fiduciary
Roles, sponsored by the Real Property, Probate & Trust Law Section of the American
Bar Association, determined that trustee malfeasance was covered by most, but not all
malpractice policies carried by lawyers. One question unresolved by the task force is
"whether the performance of fiduciary activities is or may be equivalent to performing
'legal services' or is performed in one's 'capacity as a lawyer.'" William D. Haught,
Attorneys Take Fiduciary Roles, 127 Tr. & Est., Feb. 1988, at 10, 13-14.
42. See infra part III.C.
43. Courts have disciplined attorneys for breaching their fiduciary duties. See, e.g.,
Cutler v. State Bar, 455 P.2d 108, 114 (Cal. 1969) (disbarring attorney for commingling
and mismanagement of estate funds, and noting that "[a] member of the bar ... is held to
a high standard of conduct when dealing with his clients and their funds, even though not
in an attorney-client relationship, particularly when the relationship has fiduciary as-
pects"); Florida Bar v. Rhodes, 355 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 1978) (disbarring attorney in
role of executor found guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
improper withdrawal of estate funds for personal use and benefit); In re Melin, 102
N.E.2d 119, 121 (Ill. 1951) (censuring and suspending attorney from practice for three
months for conversion of estate funds while serving as an executor, and stating that even
when not "strictly in the discharge of professional duties" any act by a lawyer "which
evidences want of professional or personal honesty, such as renders him unworthy of
public confidence affords sufficient ground for disbarment"); State ex. rel. Nebraska State
Bar Ass'n v. Bremers, 264 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Neb. 1978) (disbarring attorney for failure
to account for funds entrusted to him as executor, and stating that "[a]n attorney may be
subjected to disciplinary action for conduct outside the practice of law or the representa-
tion of clients, and for which no criminal prosecution has been instituted or conviction
had, even though such conduct might be found to have been illegal"). See also generally
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can serve as evidence in any disciplinary action.'
A fiduciary will be held to a higher standard of care when special skills
exist, or even when the client merely believes that those skills exist (due
to the fiduciary's representation). In most cases, the lawyer who serves
solely as fiduciary has been chosen as such because she is a lawyer. This
may not always be so, but generally, a client chooses a lawyer to serve as
fiduciary with the expectation that the lawyer will use her legal and pro-
fessional skills while serving as fiduciary.
Thus, a lawyer serving solely as a fiduciary should expect to be held to
the higher standard of care imposed by fiduciary law upon a fiduciary
with special skills. She should also be aware that a breach of ethical
standards may be used as evidence-if not more-of a breach of fiduciary
duty. Such a breach may also lead to disciplinary actions against the
lawyer.
II. SHOULD LAWYERS SERVE AS FIDUCIARIES AS A MATTER OF
PUBLIC POLICY?
Legal relationships are usually based on contract, status, or fiduciary
relations.45 We live in a society where people are growing increasingly
dependent upon fiduciary relations because of the need to delegate
power. Moreover, many lawyers may be finding that they are serving-
or being asked to serve-as fiduciaries, whether they like it or not.46
Some commentators have also pointed out that for business reasons, law-
yers should accept opportunities to be a fiduciary, as the changing nature
of estate planning law is curtailing the amount of legal work needed in
the field.47 This idea extends further. For example, as society becomes
more and more dependent upon government entitlement programs, we
need experts-such as lawyers who can also serve as fiduciaries-to
guide us through the legal maze of those programs.
Societal changes indicate a real need for professional and honest fiduci-
Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Conduct ofAttorney in Capacity of Executor orAdministra-
tor of Decedent's Estate as Ground for Disciplinary Action, 92 A.L.R.3d 655 (1973).
44. See Mirabito v. Liccardo, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 573-74 (Ct. App. 1992).
45. See Frankel, supra note 4, at 797-802.
46. See Bradley R. Cook, New Developments Alter the Role of Estate Planners in Rec-
ommending Fiduciaries, 16 Est. Plan. 356, 356 (Nov./Dec. 1989) ("Indeed, the fiduciary
responsibility owed by the lawyer to the client has grown significantly in recent years.
The lawyer has, in effect, become the ultimate 'caretaker' whether he likes that role or
not!").
47. See generally Cook, supra note 46, at 356-58 (noting that lawyers "almost inevita-
bly ... assume[ ] the function[s] of the "quarterback" of the estate planning team," and
the client can be better served by having his legal affairs and trust handled by the lawyer);
Haught supra note 41, at 12 (arguing that serving as fiduciary places lawyer in position of
trust and confidence, better positioning the attorney to identify and resolve a broader
range of legal, financial, and family problems); Martin A. Heckscher, The Special
Problems Which Arise When an Attorney Serves as Fiduciary, 17 ACTEC Notes 137, 138
(1991) (stating factors that contribute to the increase in the practice of attorneys serving
as fiduciaries).
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aries. The fiduciary relationship is based upon an exchange of power and
thus remains a source of potential abuse. Only with legal and ethical
safeguards on the relationship can we proceed.4" Lawyers, already func-
tioning as a fiduciary class, are monitored by professional self-regulations
in addition to fiduciary laws and malpractice risks of which they are well
aware. Thus, they are likely candidates to serve as fiduciaries.
Changes in the elderly population may indicate a particular need for
fiduciaries. There has been a dramatic increase in the elderly population
with a greater increase in those over eighty-five, most of whom are wo-
men.49 As our society becomes more and more geographically mobile
and socially fragmented, these older people often have fewer family
members to depend on.
There has also been a breakdown in the traditional family structure.
Few older people live in the same location as their children, if indeed
they have children to care for them. But the breakdown in the family
unit is not the only source of a growing need for trusted professionals to
serve as fiduciaries. Imagine the following scenarios: an older couple
planning for the needs of the spouse who survives and who may soon be
incompetent; an aging and ill parent attempting to provide for an incom-
petent child; a middle-aged or older single child without sufficient time or
desire to care for an older parent; a single older person in need of a
guardian or someone to have power of attorney regarding the elder's
health care decisions; an artist dying of AIDS who wants to protect his
art work and direct the receipt of royalties after his death. These are all
scenarios that could involve the need for a fiduciary.
Another group in need of fiduciaries are people with assets valued
under $500,000. This group lacks access to banks and corporate fiducia-
ries, which will not accept clients below a threshold asset level.5 0
There are also an increasing number of persons eligible for public enti-
tlements at federal, state, and local levels."' Pension programs such as
ERISA, for example, require fiduciaries. 2
48. See generally Luther J. Avery, The Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers are
Confusing, 131 Tr. & Est., Apr. 1992, at 8, 10 (explaining that there is a great need for
special rules in the field of estate planning to protect the client, as the estate planning
lawyer deals with future possibilities involving personal rights and relationships); AC-
TEC Commentaries to Model Rules of Professional Conduct 5 (Oct. 18, 1993) (contend-
ing that the Rules of Professional Conduct proscribe terms for resolving difficult ethical
problems); Brosterhous, supra note 41, at 14 (arguing that ethical guidelines are vital
given the potential conflicts of interest that may result when lawyers serve as fiduciaries
and the potential negligence liability); Pennell, supra note 41, ' 1801 (contending that
many of the existing rules, based on a conflict resolution perspective, are inapplicable in
the planning context).
49. See U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, America in Transition: An Aging
Society, at 7-15, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1984-85 edition (June 1985).
50. See Cook supra note 46, at 357.
51. See Nancy R. Hooyman & H. Asuman Kiyak, Social Gerontology: A Multidis-
ciplinary Perspective 505-33 (2d ed. 1991).
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1988).
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Lawyers are well suited to serve as fiduciaries because of their training
in issue spotting and analysis, substantive law, communication, conflict
resolution, and legal ethics. Although lawyers may lack expertise in such
areas as financial investments and business, they can obtain further edu-
cation in these areas or hire specialists as needed. There is also an in-
crease in the number of lawyers in the job market, which should provide
an adequate supply to meet society's growing demand for fiduciaries.
Serving as a fiduciary may also be in the financial interest of estate-plan-
ning lawyers. Besides the increase in the number of lawyers, the simplifi-
cation of probate procedures, the greater use of probate-avoiding estate
plans, and liberalized estate and gift tax credits, exclusions and deduc-
tions, contribute to the need for such lawyers to diversify and expand
their practice.
Even if lawyers do not want to serve as fiduciaries (perhaps because of
the many legal risks involved and the possibility of low remuneration for
such service), they should be fully informed about the role of fiduciaries
and know how to inform clients about the use of fiduciaries. For exam-
ple, part of any estate planning process should involve fully informing
the client of how fiduciaries work. 3
In sum, society's growing need for well-trained and honest fiduciaries,
coupled with the expertise and availability of lawyers and the fact that a
lawyer/fiduciary's conduct is regulated by rules of professional responsi-
bility as well as fiduciary law, supports a public policy that should en-
courage lawyers to serve as fiduciaries.
III. WHEN THE LAWYER SERVES AS FIDUCIARY: ETHICAL
CONSIDERATIONS AND APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Lawyers engaged in the practice of elder law and estate planning
should have clear rules of professional conduct to guide them when they
serve in fiduciary roles. Such rules are necessary to protect clients from
possible ethical misconduct by lawyers, as well as to protect lawyers from
disciplinary actions and potential malpractice liability.
The Model Rules are the legal profession's most recent attempt at ethi-
cal self-regulation. 4 The ethical standards that regulate the professional
53. See Cook, supra note 46, at 357; see also Principles for Attorneys Acting in Other
Fiduciary Roles, 1992 ABA Sec. Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. L. (Oct. 16, 1992) (on file with
Fordham Law Review) (Principle 9 provides: "Role of the Attorney in Advising the Cli-
ent. Regardless of whether the attorney is named as a fiduciary, it is the responsibility of
the attorney to advise the client as to the considerations affecting the choice of an appro-
priate fiduciary.").
54. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") were promulgated by
the American Bar Association in 1983. They replaced the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Model Code") promulgated in 1969, which had replaced the 1908 Can-
nons of Professional Ethics. According to one noted authority that discusses the codes
and standards that regulate lawyers:
[T]he various states and the federal courts have looked to the ABA versions as a
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conduct of lawyers have, to a great extent, been developed to govern the
ethical behavior of lawyers as zealous advocates. But in many areas of
legal practice, particularly in those areas most often affecting the elderly
client (such as domestic relations, estate planning, and life and health
care planning), the lawyer may also act as advisor, negotiator, intermedi-
ary, or fiduciary. The Preamble to the Model Rules acknowledges that a
lawyer performs various functions including those of advisor, advocate,
negotiator, intermediary, and evaluator." Neither the Model Rules nor
earlier ABA standards of ethical conduct, however, specifically addresses
the ethical considerations of lawyers serving as fiduciaries.56 In such
roles, the lawyer often attempts to adhere to the ethical standards set out
for zealous advocates of the individual and autonomous client. In real-
ity, the lawyer often represents various family members who view the
attorney as a professional working for the good of the family unit."
basis for regulating lawyers within the jurisdiction. Thus, the ABA's codes
have been used as the basis for state and federal codes. With the Model Code,
many states adopted the ABA version without many significant changes....
Many states have made significant modifications to the ABA version [of the
Model Rules].
Selected Statutes, Rules and Standards on the Legal Profession 1, 1-2 (Dzienkowski ed.
1992).
55. The Preamble to the Model Rules provides:
As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor,
a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal
rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a
lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary
system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but
consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others. As intermediary
between clients, a lawyer seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an advi-
sor and, to a limited extent, as a spokesperson for each client. A lawyer acts as
evaluator by examining a client's legal affairs and reporting about them to the
client or to others.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct pmbl. (1992).
56. Luther Avery has written extensively on lawyers as fiduciaries. He notes that
"lawyer specialists like estate planners [should] develop procedures that will be prudent
and productive in the face of rules that were not designed with their best interests in
mind." Avery, supra note 48, at 10. He further notes that "[w]hat the estate planning
lawyer must recognize is that the problem areas arising out of the mandates and uncer-
tainties of the ABA and state rules of professional conduct, also arise out of the fact that
the lawyer's relationship with the client is a fiduciary relationship." Id.
The preface to the ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct states:
Neither the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ... nor the Comments to
them provide sufficiently explicit guidance regarding the professional responsi-
bilities of lawyers engaged in a trusts and estates practice. Recognizing the need
to fill the gap, ACTEC has developed the following Commentaries on selected
rules to provide some particularized guidance to ACTEC Fellows and others
regarding their professional responsibilities.
ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 48 (preface).
57. In discussing the ethical dilemmas confronted by elder lawyers, one commentator
notes: "Elder lawyers view conflict of interest rules as the most troublesome source of
their ethical dilemmas. Many assert that the Model Rules' conflict of interest principles
are rooted in the traditional, adversarial one-on-one attorney-client relationship and thus
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This section addresses the question of whether the existing ethical
standards, particularly those codified within the Model Rules, 58 suffi-
ciently regulate the possible situations that may arise when a lawyer
serves in a fiduciary capacity. The three main problem areas of focus are:
(1) when the drafting lawyer is also named a fiduciary; (2) when the law-
yer/fiduciary also serves as the lawyer for the fiduciary; and (3) the possi-
ble conflict of interest problems that may arise when the lawyer serves
solely as fiduciary.
Ethical considerations common to these three main areas fall into two
basic groups: those concerning the appointment of the lawyer as fiduci-
ary and those relating to the lawyer's actual function as a fiduciary.
Questions of solicitation, undue influence, overreaching, and the appear-
ance of impropriety arise when a client asks a lawyer to serve in a fiduci-
ary role, whether or not that lawyer has also drafted the client's
testamentary instrument. Issues regarding dual compensation are signifi-
cant because a lawyer serving both as attorney and executor of an estate
may earn substantial fees for both roles. A lawyer's appointment as exec-
utor may directly result from that lawyer's desire for the fees she may
earn for performing both of those tasks.
A lawyer who serves as executor or trustee under the will she has
drafted assumes additional specific fiduciary responsibilities regarding
the client's estate, beyond her continuing fiduciary duty to the former
testator/client. 9 These various responsibilities may well lead to serious
conflict of interest problems. Multiple client representation, as in the
representation of a family unit, also poses ethical dilemmas for the law-
yer as fiduciary. The Model Rules' conflict of interest principles do not
resolve these issues.
This section analyzes the application of the Model Rules to various
situations occurring under the three main areas noted above. The Model
Rules that most often apply in fiduciary situations are those dealing with
confidentiality;6' conflicts of interest;6 and the lawyer as advisor and in-
termediary.62  Other pertinent rules are also discussed when
cannot adequately address elder law issues." Batt, supra note 3, at 326 (emphasis in
original) (footnotes omitted).
58. Special emphasis is placed upon the Model Rules because the majority of states
follow them. See supra note 54.
59. According to one commentator:
If the attorney acts as executor, he assumes fiduciary responsibilities towards
the estate. If the attorney acts as the attorney who handles the legal affairs of
the estate, he becomes a fiduciary towards the executor, or, in some states, to-
wards the estate itself. If the attorney acts both as executor and attorney, the
question of where his fiduciary responsibilities lie becomes quite complex.
Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., A Matter of Ethics Ignored: The Attorney-Draftsman as Testa-
mentary Fiduciary, 36 Kan. L. Rev. 275, 277 n.9 (1988) (citation omitted).
60. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1992).
61. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9 (1992).
62. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 2.1, 2.2 (1992).
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appropriate.63
The Model Rules, however, do not stand alone. Other considerations
include previously established standards of professional conduct, case
law which discusses ethical misconduct and the application of these stan-
dards, ethics opinions, and commentaries. This section concludes that
while the Model Rules are in many ways more flexible than previously
promulgated standards, they do not adequately address the ethical
problems that arise when lawyers serve as fiduciaries. Several options for
providing lawyers who serve as fiduciaries with clearer ethical guidelines
are suggested.
A. The Attorney/Drafter as Fiduciary
This section analyzes the ethical consequences of an attorney/drafter
designating herself in wills (or trusts) as a fiduciary for the estate."
Should a drafting attorney ever serve as a fiduciary? If so, why? What
ethical issues are potentially raised when the lawyer is named fiduciary in
the instrument she drafts? How is such a situation affected by the ethical
rules and existing case law? Finally, how should these situations be
regulated?
1. Should the Attorney/Drafter Serve as Fiduciary?
Although the practice of lawyers appointing themselves as fiduciaries
in wills they draft is fraught with ethical problems (including fee consid-
erations, solicitation, undue influence, overreaching, and conflict of inter-
est issues), there are times when such behavior may be desirable.
There are no ethical or legal prohibitions against an attorney serving as
fiduciary. 65 The practice of lawyers serving as trustees or other fiducia-
ries is common in certain areas of the country, notably Boston and Phila-
delphia.66 In those cities, several law firms have sizeable in-house trust
departments and individual lawyers have served families as trustees for
generations.67
63. The American Bar Association Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section
Special Committee on Professional Responsibility recently prepared two articles concern-
ing the application of the relevant codes to situations involving lawyers serving in fiduci-
ary capacities. The papers, made available in October of 1993, are entitled "Preparation
of Wills and Trusts That Name Drafting Lawyer as Fiduciary" and "Counseling the
Fiduciary."
64. Virtually the same ethical considerations apply either when a lawyer who has
drafted a will is designated as the will's executor or when a lawyer who prepares an inter
vivos or testamentary trust is named to serve as trustee. See Gerald P. Johnston, An
Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices-Is Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45
Ohio St. L.J. 57, 88 (1984).
65. See Edgar C. Gentle, III, Lawyers as Executors and Trusteer Snakes and Lad-
ders, Ala. Law., Mar. 1987, at 94, 94; Panel, Lawyers Serving as Executors and Trustees, 7
Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 745, 748 (1972).
66. See Haught, supra note 41, at 10; Heckscher, supra note 47, at 137.
67. See Haught, supra note 41, at 10 ("One estimate is that Boston law firms, in the
aggregate, have assets under fiduciary management in the range of S3 to S4 billion.");
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In other parts of the country, the number of attorneys who serve as
fiduciaries may depend on whether the jurisdiction permits the fiduciary
to earn extra compensation for legal services rendered in connection with
the estate. A 1975 American Bar Foundation comparative study of es-
tate administration in the United States found that in those states where
a lawyer serving as fiduciary was entitled to double compensation, ap-
proximately ten percent of the estates were administered by attorneys.68
In states where the fiduciary was not entitled to double compensation,
the percentage of attorneys serving as personal representatives dropped
to one or two percent.69 Thus, as some commentators have suggested,
the main reason attorneys are willing to serve as fiduciaries may be be-
cause "they can earn substantial legal fees during probate that more than
offset the tendency among practitioners to undercharge for their work in
planning estates and preparing the necessary implementing
documents."7 °
Good reasons exist for the nomination of the lawyer/draftsman as fi-
duciary. A lawyer may have served as the client/testator's lawyer for
many years and may have become familiar with the testator's family,
personal interests, and financial affairs. When such a level of familiarity
and intimacy exists, the lawyer-as a trusted advisor-may very well be
the logical person to appoint as executor or trustee.
In some cases, the client/testator may not have any other trusted per-
son, such as a family member, who can be depended upon to serve in a
fiduciary role. Any existing family members, beneficiaries, or legatees,
may be incapable of serving as fiduciary due to age, domicile, citizenship,
health, or mental capacity. In such circumstances, the lawyer may ac-
cept designation as a fiduciary as an accommodation to the client.
The client/testator may also want to vest a great deal of discretion in
the executor and may think that a lawyer/executor-especially one who
has dealt with the testator in the past-would better serve the benefi-
ciaries than would a beneficiary or a corporate fiduciary. Moreover, a
client may not meet a corporate fiduciary's asset thresholds.
The client/testator may also believe that the lawyer has expertise in
both drafting the instrument and in estate management. Indeed, legal
training and knowledge may make the lawyer better suited than others to
manage an estate even though no long-term or intimate relationship ex-
ists between the client/testator and the lawyer.71
Frank Coolidge, New Avenue for Lawyers Boasts Old Tradition, Tr. & Est., Dec. 1989, at
20, 20; Lawyers Serving as Executors and Trustees, supra note 65, at 745.
68. See Louis D. Laurino, The Duties and Responsibilities of the Attorney/Fiduciary,
in 19 Univ. of Miami Philip E. Heckerling Inst. on Est. Plan. 1 1601.2 (John T. Gaubatz
ed. 1985).
69. See id.
70. Johnston, supra note 64, at 87; see also Haught, supra note 41, at 14 (arguing that
providing fiduciary services is not profitable unless offered with sufficient regularity and
volume).
71. Martin A. Heckscher notes that another reason why client/testators may want to
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There are also some drawbacks to appointing a lawyer as fiduciary.
The very fact that a long-term, intimate relationship exists between the
client/testator and lawyer may provide the lawyer with the opportunity
to influence the client inappropriately in selecting the fiduciary. Further-
more, the lawyer may be so trusted that the client will not find it neces-
sary to obtain advice from outside counsel. Such a situation might
provide the lawyer with the power to abuse her fiduciary status.
2. Ethical Issues Potentially Raised When a Lawyer Drafts an
Instrument Naming the Lawyer as Fiduciary
Improper solicitation and conflicts of interest are the main ethical is-
sues raised when a lawyer drafts a will in which she is named as a fiduci-
ary. While these issues are avoided if the client initiates the nomination,
problems may arise when the client has not requested such service.
When a lawyer is asked to write a will or trust instrument for a client,
she enters into a confidential relationship. The lawyer owes that client a
duty of loyalty and is ethically obliged to act competently, to deal fairly,
and to provide full disclosure. A competent lawyer has to explain to the
cient/testator the need for, and duties of, an executor (or trustee, de-
pending on the instrument). The lawyer must make this explanation
without imposing services on the client.
A cient/testator may have little understanding of the role and func-
tions of a fiduciary. As Gerald P. Johnston has pointed out, a client may
not be able to "protect his or her own interests from an overzealous at-
torney when the person being solicited is not even aware of the
solicitation.""2
Clients seeking advice about their wills are often in an extremely vul-
nerable position. Often they are concerned about the well-being of loved
ones and realize the importance of legal assistance to execute their testa-
mentary wishes. Lawyers may run the risk of unduly influencing clients
or overreaching simply because a client-lawyer relationship already ex-
ists: the client inherently believes in and trusts her lawyer.
The designation of a drafting lawyer as fiduciary may also involve con-
flict of interests problems. If the lawyer acts as executor, she assumes
fiduciary responsibilities towards the estate. Thus, she serves now as a
fiduciary for the beneficiaries whose interests may conflict with the
wishes of the testator.
3. Prior and Current Ethics Rules
In the days before the Model Code, "the practice of an attorney draft-
ing a will and naming himself as a fiduciary was seldom questioned." 73
appoint their lawyer as fiduciary is the client's freedom to select his own executor or
trustee. See Heckscher, supra note 47, at 137-38.
72. Johnston, supra note 64, at 90.
73. deFuria, supra note 59, at 278.
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Indeed, the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics were seldom used as the
basis for questioning the common practice of such an appointment.74
The overriding opinion was that so long as the client originally had the
idea for the attorney to serve as fiduciary, then there were no ethical
violations.
The Model Code was promulgated in 1969 and had three parts: the
Canons, the Ethical Considerations ("EC"), and the Disciplinary Rules
("DR"). Only the DR's were mandatory, providing the minimum stan-
dards below which no attorney could fall without being subjected to dis-
ciplinary action. The EC's were merely aspirational, and the Canons
were simply statements of general norms.
EC 5-6 is directly on point for this situation: "A lawyer should not
consciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee, or lawyer
in an instrument. In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer
as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the appearance
of impropriety. 7
The terms "consciously influence" and "appearance of impropriety"
are vague and thus hardly provided the lawyer with clear guidelines as to
ethical conduct under the circumstances. In a 1977 opinion, the Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics of the New York State Bar Association
interpreted the EC 5-6 phrase "consciously influence" to mean "substan-
tially less psychological pressure than 'undue influence.' "76 In his analy-
sis of the phrase, one commentator believes it to "describe the act of
overreaching for employment of a kind for which the lawyer has not been
retained and could not otherwise reasonably expect to obtain. '77
A more recent commentator has found EC 5-6 to be an unsatisfactory
standard for lawyers who are asked to serve in other fiduciary roles be-
cause the rule is so vague: "the appearance of impropriety standard has
been repeatedly criticized as being entirely subjective, [and] generally ap-
plicable through hindsight. How does one determine conscious influ-
ence? Does conscious influence differ from undue influence?" 78
74. The prevailing attitude of the time is reflected in this passage from a leading com-
mentator on legal ethics:
A question is sometimes raised as to the propriety of... a provision appointing
[the drafting lawyer as] executor or trustee, or one directing [the] executors to
employ [the lawyer] as counsel for the estate. This, of course, depends on the
surrounding circumstances. If they are such that the lawyer might reasonably
be accused of using undue influence, he will be wise to have the provision in-
serted in a codicil drawn by another lawyer. Where, however, a testator is en-
tirely competent and the relation has been a longstanding one, and where the
suggestion originates with the testator, there is no necessity of having another
lawyer in the case ... of a provision appointing the draftsman executor, or of a
direction that he be retained by the executors.
Id. at 280 (quoting Henry S. Drinker, Legal Ethics 94 (1953)).
75. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-6 (1980).
76. Opinion No. 481, 50 N.Y. St. B.J. 356, 356 (1978).
77. Laurino, supra note 68, 1601.1(A)(1).
78. Brosterhous, supra note 41, at 14.
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The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct have eliminated EC 5-
6. There is no specific provision in the Model Rules regarding the ap-
pointment of a lawyer as a fiduciary. Although deleted from the final
version of the Model Rules, a note to Model Rule 1.8 in the Proposed
Final Draft of the Model Rules states:
EC 5-6 of the Code states that a lawyer should not seek to have himself
or a partner or associate named in an instrument as executor of the
client's estate .... Such an appointment is not expressly prohibited
under this Rule, but is subject to the general conflict of interest provi-
sion in Rule 1.7 and the more specific requirements of paragraph (a) of
... Rule [1.8]. 79
Thus, the Model Rules intended that the appointment of a lawyer as
fiduciary be governed by the conflict of interest rules, particularly 1.7(b)
and 1.8(a).10 Neither of these rules, however, are situation-specific and
could easily be overlooked by a lawyer.
More than the rule itself, the commentary to Rule 1.7(b) indicates that
the lawyer must not encourage her appointment as fiduciary in order to
achieve some personal pecuniary gain." Nonetheless, the rule and com-
mentary fail to give guidance to the lawyer who must inform a client of
the role, functions, and compensation of the fiduciary, and who believes
79. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8, Legal Background (Proposed Fi-
nal Draft 1981).
80. Model Rule 1.7(b) states:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.
According to Model Rule 1.8(a):
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse
to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are
fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in
writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by
the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of in-
dependent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8 (1992).
81. The Comment to Rule 1.7 provides: "The lawyer's own interests should not be
permitted to have adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, a lawyer's
need for income should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled
competently and at a reasonable fee." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7
cmt. (1992).
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that she is probably the best choice as fiduciary for that client.8 2
Some commentators believe that while Rule 1.8(a) explicitly prohibits
a lawyer/drafter from receiving a testamentary gift, it ignores the similar
situation of the lawyer's potential for gain as an appointed fiduciary. 3
Under Rule 1.8(a), a lawyer may be named fiduciary in an instrument
she prepares and may receive payment for both roles if: (1) the situation
is "fair" and "reasonable" to the client and the lawyer gives full disclo-
sure in writing; (2) the client is given the reasonable opportunity to seek
independent counsel; and (3) the client consents in writing.8 4
The meaning of this rule is unclear in the case of the lawyer/drafter
who is appointed as fiduciary. For example, what information needs to
be provided to constitute full disclosure and for the client to reasonably
understand. It appears possible that even after full disclosure and con-
sultation with outside counsel, a disgruntled beneficiary could claim that
the lawyer used undue influence, especially if the client was in a vulnera-
ble condition at the time of the appointment and the lawyer was a trusted
individual. On the other hand, in such a situation, it may never be possi-
ble actually to prove undue influence because a trusted lawyer may have
an ethical obligation to serve as fiduciary to a needy client.
82. In the ACTEC Commentaries to The Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
1.7, the following applies to the appointment of scrivener as fiduciary:
An individual is generally free to select and appoint whomever he or she wishes
to a fiduciary office (e.g., trustee, executor, attorney-in-fact). None of the provi-
sions of the MRPC deals explicitly with the propriety of a lawyer preparing for
a client a will or other document that appoints the lawyer to a fiduciary office.
As a general proposition lawyers should be permitted to assist adequately in-
formed clients who wish to appoint their lawyers as fiduciaries. Accordingly, a
lawyer should be free to prepare a document that appoints the lawyer to a fidu-
ciary office so long as the client is properly informed, the appointment does not
violate the conflict of interest rules of MRPC 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General
Rule), and the appointment is not the product of undue influence or improper
solicitation by the lawyer. This conclusion is consistent with EC 5-6:
A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him as execu-
tor, trustee, or lawyer in an instrument. In those cases where a client
wishes to name his lawyer as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to
avoid even the appearance of impropriety.
(In some instances a lawyer may reasonably conclude that Rule 1.8
(Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions) is implicated in which case
the lawyer should comply with the provisions of Rule 1.8(a).)
For the purposes of this commentary a client is properly informed if the
client is provided with information regarding the role and duties of the
fiduciary, the ability of a layperson to serve as fiduciary with legal and
other professional assistance, and the comparative costs of appointing the
lawyer or another person or institution as fiduciary. The client should also
be informed of any significant lawyer-client relationship that exists between
the lawyer or the lawyer's firm and a corporate fiduciary under considera-
tion for appointment.
ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 48, at 49-50.
83. See Johnston, supra note 64, at 87-88; Leonard Levin, Legal Ramifications of
Unethical Estate Planning Practices, Tr. & Est., Oct. 1985, at 47, 49.
84. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(a) (1992).
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4. Ethics Opinions and Case Law
While several ethics opinions and commentators condemn the routine
insertion of provisions in wills appointing lawyer/drafters as fiduciaries,
the case law has not been particularly unfavorable to such
appointments."5
Two significant state ethics opinions offer differing views on the sub-
ject. As noted above, a New York State Bar ethics opinion interpreted
the EC 5-6 phrase "consciously influence" to mean "substantially less
psychological pressure than 'undue influence.' "816 The opinion also
stated that ethical conduct does not require in all instances that the testa-
tor make the initial suggestion for the lawyer to serve as executor.8 7
There are some instances-for example, a long-term relationship between
lawyer and client or a lawyer sincerely believing that the client desired
that particular lawyer to serve as fiduciary-that would justify the lawyer
offering her services as executor.""
- The Wisconsin Ethics Committee, however, found that even though it
is not per se unethical for a lawyer/drafter to name herself executor or
legal counsel for the estate, the attorney should furnish persuasive evi-
dence that the client acted on his own in the appointment.8 9
One of the leading cases in the area of ethics in estate planning is the
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Wisconsin v. Gulbankian.9" In
Gulbankian, the court held that it was unprofessional for an attorney to
solicit business by directly or indirectly suggesting to a testator that the
attorney or an associate should be employed as executor or as attorney to
the executor.9 ' Moreover, the Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed both
circumstantial evidence and direct testimony to prove such solicitation. 92
In this disciplinary proceeding, the court found that the record did not
show that the two attorneys, a brother and sister who practiced as part-
ners, had solicited the probate of estates by drafting wills designating
themselves as executors or attorneys for the executors because they had
been the only Armenian attorneys in the county for many years and that
85. See generally deFuria, supra note 59 (arguing that courts are too lenient in al-
lowing lawyers to designate themselves as executor); Laurino, supra note 68 (commenting
on attorney's fiduciary duties in drafting and executing wills); Frank D. Wagner, Annota-
tion, Attorneys at Law: Disciplinary Proceeding Based Upon Attorney's Naming of Him-
self or Associate as Executor or Attorney for Executor in Will Drafted by Him, 57 A.LR
3d 703, 704 (1974) (discussing cases sanctioning attorneys who designated themselves as
executor).
86. Opinion No. 481, 50 N.Y. St. B.J. 356, 356 (1978).
87. See id. at 357.
88. See id For a recent affirmation of the New York State Bar Association's interpre-
tation of EC 5-6, see In re Will of Corya, 563 N.Y.S.2d 581, 585 (Sur. Ct. 1990), rey'don
other grounds, 572 N.Y.S.2d 51 (App. Div. 1991).
89. See Memorandum Opinion No. 10-76, Wis. B. Bull. 91, 91 (Supp. June 1979).
90. 196 N.W.2d 733 (Wis. 1972).
91. See id. at 736.
92. See id, at 735-37.
1994] 1379
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
many of their clients had been Armenians. a This was the finding of the
court notwithstanding the fact that between 1955 and 1971 approxi-
mately 94% of the wills filed by the brother and sister were wills they
had drafted in which either they or some member of their family had
been requested to serve in a fiduciary capacity.
94
The court further noted that in Racine County up to 71% of wills
drawn contained such provisions and this widespread practice could lead
the public to perceive pervasive solicitation by the drafting attorneys.95
However, in this case of first impression, the court did find that an attor-
ney should not use a will form for the designation of the drafter as attor-
ney for the probate of an estate or as executor.96 Furthermore, an
attorney must be especially careful not to intimate, suggest, or solicit,
directly or indirectly, her employment when discussing the identity and
duties of an executor with the client.97
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v.
Walker,98 punished a lawyer for professional misconduct in connection
with estate planning and the subsequent administration of the estate. 99
The attorney drafted the will for an elderly client whose estate was val-
ued in excess of $2,000,000. 10 He was named co-executor along with his
father, and a beneficiary under the will.'O° After the death of the client,
the lawyer-as co-executor-also named himself attorney for the es-
tate.'1 2 He claimed $32,500 in commissions along with his deceased fa-
ther's $62,500 in commissions, $22,000 in attorneys fees, and his 1/4
share of the residue, $239,000. 13 The other residuary legatees filed ex-
ceptions to this account and he settled these claims by paying the three
other residuary legatees $80,000 each." The account was approved, but
the probate court referred the matter to the state disciplinary board. 0 5
The Disciplinary Board found improprieties in both the preparation
93. See id. at 735.
94. See id. at 734.
95. See id. at 736-37.
96. See id. at 737.
97. See id. at 736-37; see also Zeigler v. Coffin, 123 So. 22, 24 (Ala. 1929) (stating that
the attorney should not exert "undue influence" in the execution of testator's will); In re
Isaacs, 541 N.Y.S.2d 60, 60 (App. Div. 1989) (finding respondent guilty of misconduct
for influencing client to designate him as executor and respondent's brother as alternate
executor); Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W. 2d 433, 441-42 (N.D. 1980) (recom-
mending that attorneys should not draft wills in which they are named as beneficiaries,
but finding no misconduct when defendant drafted will, was named as beneficiary and
executor due to the close relationship with client and because client refused advice to use
another attorney).
98. 366 A.2d 563 (Pa. 1976).
99. See id. at 569.





105. See id. at 566.
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and administration of the estate.10 6 While the state committee had ini-
tially recommended private censure, the Disciplinary Board censured
him publicly. 0 7 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania imposed a one-year
suspension from the practice of law and ordered that all executor's fees
and attorney's fees collected by the lawyer be refunded to the estate and
distributed in conformity with the terms of the will.'0
The court imposed these sanctions for the lawyer's gross abuse of posi-
tion and knowledge of the law in dealing with other beneficiaries, for
discouraging the use of outside counsel, for failure to fully explain the
conflict of interests between his role in the administration of the estate,
his role as beneficiary, and the roles of the other beneficiaries, and for
failing to explain to the other beneficiaries the need for an independent
attorney for the estate. °9
Katz v. Usdan (In re Weinstock),"10 is another example of extreme im-
propriety and overreaching and remains the leading case in the area of
ethical misconduct by attorneys serving as fiduciaries.' 1  In Weinstock
an elderly testator wanted to revise his will and intended to minimize the
commissions to executors." 2 The attorney and the attorney's son, who
were previously total strangers to the client, were named the new execu-
tors. 113 At the time of probate, the court struck these appointments as
constructive fraud, because, on the basis of EC 5-6, the testator had not
independently and freely designated the attorneys to be his executors."I4
The court also found that the executors would each have been entitled to
a full commission under New York law even though there was no pur-
pose in having two executors." 5
The court in Weinstock stated that the mere naming of an attorney/
drafter as fiduciary does not give rise to an inference of undue influ-
ence.1 16 This is in contrast to when an attorney has prepared a will and
is named a beneficiary, which does give rise to a presumption of undue
influence. 117 Some jurisdictions, especially in New York, find that an
attorney/drafter named as a co-executor, who fails to advise the testator
of double commissions, risks disqualification from service or denial of
106. See id
107. See id at 568.
108. See id at 569.
109. See id
110. 351 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1976).
111. See id at 647-48.
112. See iL at 648.
113. See id
114. See id at 649.
115. See id. at 649 n.*.
116. For a discussion of recent cases following Weinstock, see Heckscher, supra note
47, at 140-43; Nancy Stranger Wood, Selection of Fiduciaries and the Role of the Attorney
Draftsperson, Ethical Considerations, Administrative Powers, Simultaneous Death, and
Tax Apportionment, in Handling Your First Basic Will 1992, at 201, 204-09 (PLI Tax &
Est. Plan. Course Handbook Series No. D4-5236, 1992).
117. See Smith v. Mitchell (In re Putnam's Will), 177 N.E. 399, 400 (N.Y. 1931).
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commissions upon serving. 18 In other jurisdictions, the attorney desig-
nated as fiduciary is considered a beneficiary and thus the burden of
proof is cast upon the proponent of the will to establish there was no
undue influence.1 19
5. Malpractice Actions Against Lawyer/Drafter/Fiduciary
Another aspect of ethical misconduct important to the attorney serv-
ing as fiduciary is the possibility that the breach of an ethical duty will
create a civil cause of action for malpractice. Although the Model Rules
explicitly state that a breach of an ethical duty is not a basis for civil
liability and many courts follow this principle, other courts have found
that a breach creates a rebuttable presumption of malpractice. 120
In an unreported Texas trial court opinion, a widow obtained a multi-
million dollar settlement because of attorney malpractice. 12' She had al-
leged that the firm had a conflict of interest in drawing her husband's
will. The trial court rejected the defense, asserted by the lawyer/fiduci-
ary whose firm drafted the will, that the purported exculpatory language
in the will excused any breach of trust. 1 2
6. Possible Ethics Rules Options on Attorney/Drafter Named as
Fiduciary
In the face of general confusion in applying the ethical rules (not to
mention the threat of malpractice liability) to lawyer/drafters serving as
fiduciaries, we review here various options.
a. Option A: Absolute Prohibition Against the Attorney/Drafter
Serving as Fiduciary
Joseph W. deFuria, Jr. suggests that an absolute rule should be estab-
118. See In re Laflin, 491 N.Y.S.2d 35, 35 (App. Div. 1985).
119. See Zeigler v. Coffin, 123 So. 22, 24 (Ala. 1929).
120. For example, according to the court in Kidney Ass'n v. Ferguson (In re Estate of
Ragan),
[t]his court has held that a lawyer's violation of disciplinary rules does not, in
itself, establish the lawyer's negligence .... This is the common rule across the
nation. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington has gone further by
disallowing any reference to disciplinary rules in a legal malpractice case be-
cause of the court's conclusion that the rules were not intended to set a standard
for civil liability.
843 P.2d 442, 446 n.12 (Or. 1992) (citations omitted).
In contrast, for a finding that a breach of ethical rules creates a rebuttable presumption
of malpractice, see Jenkins v. Wheeler, 316 S.E.2d 354, 358 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984). See
generally Link, supra note 38, at 11-12 n.14 (discussing cases where "courts [have found]
that a breach of ethical rules creates a rebuttable presumption of malpractice").
121. See Willeford v. Willingham, Civ. No. 84 PC 3158 (Bexar County, Tex.) (filed
Oct. 25, 1984); Link, supra note 38, at 8-9 (discussing Willeford).
122. See Willeford v. Willingham, Civ. No. 84 PC 3158 (Bexar County, Tex.) (filed
Oct. 25, 1984); Heckscher, supra note 47, at 142, 143-44; Link, supra note 38, at 8-9
(discussing Willeford).
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lished: an attorney is absolutely precluded from drafting a testamentary
instrument in which she is named as fiduciary.'2 3 Furthermore, if a cli-
ent insists that her regular attorney serve in a fiduciary capacity under
her will, the document would have to be drafted by a truly independent
attorney.124 This prohibition would be useful in cutting out potentially
hard to detect undue influence and in forcing the parties to have an in-
dependent lawyer draw the instrument.
Certainly a lawyer who drafts a will is in the position to influence her
client as well as profit from further appointment. As the case law readily
indicates, lawyers are not beyond such overreaching. Clients are likely to
accept a lawyer's suggestion for self-nomination because they are trust-
ing, incapacitated, or ignorant of the consequences of such a nomination.
An absolute prohibition would also be consistent with EC 5-612" and
Rule 1.8(c) which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not prepare an instru-
ment giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child,
sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamen-
tary gift, except where the client is related to the donee."' t2 6 Several com-
mentators believe that there is no significant difference between a lawyer/
drafter naming herself a direct beneficiary in a will she drafts and the
lawyer/drafter who names herself as executor of the estate.t27 In both
cases, the lawyer is actively engaged in providing for her own future in-
terests-in possible direct conflict with the interests of the client.
A flat prohibition, however, may be too extreme an option. Even com-
mentators wary of lawyer misconduct find that an absolute prohibition
would be harmful in those cases where the testator truly wants the law-
yer to serve as fiduciary and does not want the inconvenience or extra
expense of obtaining independent counsel.' 28 As Leonard Levin points
out, a flat prohibition would also cause serious disruption to the legiti-
mate expectations of clients.' 29
b. Option B: A Return to EC 5-6
Some have argued that EC 5-6 does provide specific guidelines to law-
yers and still allows lawyers to be fiduciaries when there is no uncon-
scious influence. 3 This interpretation also appears consistent with a
policy intended to encourage lawyer appointments as fiduciaries. How-
123. See deFuria, supra note 59, at 309.
124. See id
125. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-6 (1980).
126. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(c) (1992).
127. See, e g. Johnston, supra note 64, at 89 & n.197 (suggesting that there are only
subtle distinctions between an attorney/draftsman and an attorney/executor).
128. See id. at 99 (discussing usefulness of lawyer serving dual purpose as both drafter
and fiduciary).
129. See Levin, supra note 83, at 50.
130. See ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 48, at 49-50; Laurino, supra note 68, V
1601.1.A.1-2 ("The prohibition of EC 5-6 is self-explanatory and far clearer than the
general language of the Model Rule and should be retained.").
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ever, as Patricia Brosterhous notes, the standards are vague and just do
not provide the practitioner with useful guidelines.13 1
c. Option C: Stick to Model Rules 1. 7(b) and 1.8(a)
Option C would allow Model Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a) to serve as guide-
posts for the attorney/drafter as fiduciary. But, as discussed above, these
rules do not specifically address the problems that arise when lawyers
serve as fiduciaries. Brosterhous and Luther J. Avery believe that EC 5-6
was too restrictive and that the Model Rules are more flexible because
they allow practitioners in different areas of the law to develop their own
guidelines not in contradiction with the Model Rules. 132
d. Option D: Principles for Attorneys Acting in Fiduciary Roles
Option D would follow the path laid out by the Principles for Attor-
neys Acting in Other Fiduciary Roles.'33 These principles were devel-
oped in 1988 by the ABA Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law's Task Force on Attorneys Acting in Other Fiduciary Roles. There
are nine different principles, and although only the first one is entitled
"ethics," they all touch on problems we have noted in this discussion.
The introduction sets forth that a "client or non-client has and should
have the right to appoint a fiduciary of the client's own choice."' 35 Fur-
thermore, "the appointment of the attorney to serve as an executor or
trustee or in another fiduciary role may be appropriate even if the attor-
ney or another attorney in the attorney's firm drafts the governing docu-
ment." 1 36  Thus, in direct opposition to Option A, the Principles
acknowledge that there may be times when a lawyer/drafter may best
serve her client by also serving as fiduciary.
The ethical restrictions placed on the attorney who drafts a document
naming such attorney to serve as a fiduciary are that there should first be
a full disclosure to the client of all relevant matters, including fees, and
an informed discussion of viable alternatives. Finally, the choice of a fi-
duciary in all events must be freely made.
Principle number nine provides that whether or not an attorney is
named as a fiduciary, it remains the attorney's responsibility to advise the
client about the considerations affecting the choice of an appropriate
fiduciary. 13
7
131. See Brosterhous, supra note 41, at 12-27.
132. See generally Avery, supra note 48 (discussing the ability of lawyers to deal with
the problems inherent in the Model Rules); Brosterhous, supra note 41, at 12 (suggesting
that the Model Rules offered lawyers an opportunity to develop standards of their own).
133. See Principles for Attorneys Acting in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 53.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. For an excellent comparison of the Principles to the Model Code and the
Model Rules, see Brosterhous, supra note 41, at 14-18.
137. See Principles for Attorneys Acting in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 53.
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Generally, these principles are client oriented. They attempt to ex-
amine the best interests of a client in need of a fiduciary and to provide
basic guidelines for the lawyer who may find herself in the position of
serving as a fiduciary. Nonetheless, the principles do not explain to the
lawyer what proof may be required for a showing of a "full disclosure,"
and what it means that the choice of a fiduciary "must be freely
made."138
e. Option E: The Nomination of the Attorney/Drafter as Fiduciary
Under State Law
Finally the question remains whether the attorney/drafter's nomina-
tion as fiduciary will be upheld under state law. As noted earlier, the
judicial procedures in several New York counties provide a framework
for proving that the nomination was not the product of undue influence.
In New York, the Uniform Rules for Surrogate's Courts section
207.19(g) requires the filing of a statement at the time of probate disclos-
ing that the named fiduciary is an attorney, whether the attorney will be
estate counsel, and whether the attorney was the drafter. Uniform Rules
for Surrogate's Courts section 207.60 requires the filing of an affidavit
within twelve months of the issuance of letters as to commissions and
legal fees if the attorney is either the sole executor/administrator and
also the estate attorney, or is a co-fiduciary and the estate attorney when
there is no other fiduciary who is not an attorney. As Nancy Stranger
Wood points out, various counties have further requirements.'3 9
In New York County, for example, the surrogate may inquire into
why the attorney was named and whether the client was aware that the
attorney would be paid commissions and legal fees."'4
In Queens County, if the fiduciary is an attorney then an accounting
must be filed within twelve months of an appointment or twenty-four
months if a federal estate tax return is required, regardless of whether
another attorney or firm represents the estate.' 4 ' Furthermore, the ac-
counting may not be waived with consent of the beneficiaries.' 4 In
Queens, when an attorney is nominated as fiduciary, an affidavit must be
submitted as to the following: (1) the length and nature of the attorney's
association with the testator prior to the date of the will; (2) the reasons
the decedent gave for selecting the attorney as fiduciary; (3) conversa-
tions between the testator and the attorney-drafter regarding fees and
138. For other suggestions regarding the ethical conduct of lawyers serving as fiducia-
ries, see Guidelines for Estate Planners, 13 Prob. Notes 7 (1987); A Baker's Dozen Topics,
10 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 243 (1975).
139. See Wood, supra note 116, at 207-08; see also, Heckscher, supra note 47, at 140-
41 (noting that the surrogate court in Suffolk County adopted a rule requiring the testa-
tor's to state by affidavit the reasons for nominating the attorney as fiduciary and that the
testator was advised about the fees that the attorney would be entitled to recover).





commissions; (4) whether the attorney-fiduciary or her firm will also
serve as the estate attorney, and if not, why not (a hearing is required to
explain why not); and (5) the attorney must attach her drafting notes,
including next-of-kin data.14 3
f. Suggested Solution
In sum, we suggest that an attorney should avoid being named as fidu-
ciary simply because she happens to draft a will or trust. Nevertheless, a
client may want to name a drafting attorney as fiduciary if there is a
longstanding lawyer-client relationship, or if the client has no one else to
name (recognizing that the attorney provides the client with a trusted,
competent person as well as the prospect of continuity through the attor-
ney's firm). There may also be times when the drafting attorney is not
well known by the testator, however, she still may be the proper person
to be named as fiduciary. For instance, if a client's assets do not qualify
for a corporate fiduciary, no other family member or trusted person is
available, and/or the client recognizes the attorney (and/or her firm) as
capable of providing the confidentiality and continuity that the specific
situation may demand. To allow for the attorney/drafter to function as a
fiduciary, there must be well defined and clear safeguards for the protec-
tion of the client, the lawyer, and indeed the legal profession. These
guidelines are not to be in contradiction with the Model Code or Model
Rules, but should stand alongside them, just as the principles discussed
in Option D attempt to do. Furthermore, as in several New York coun-
ties, surrogate or probate court procedures should require an attorney/
drafter to prove that the nomination as fiduciary was free from undue
influence.
B. Dual Capacities: Should a Lawyer/Fiduciary Be Able To Serve
Also as the Attorney for the Fiduciary, or To Employ the Law
Firm with Which She Is Associated as the Attorney
for the Fiduciary?
A lawyer may serve as a fiduciary (e.g., as executor or personal repre-
sentative for an estate) or as legal counsel for a fiduciary. Serious ethical
and legal considerations arise when a lawyer serves in the dual capacity
of both fiduciary and lawyer for herself as fiduciary. Further complica-
tions may ensue when the lawyer serving in such a dual capacity is also
the scrivener of the testamentary instrument that designates her for those
estate administration roles.
As we have earlier seen, there are situations in which it is desirable to
have lawyers serving as fiduciaries. We have also examined circum-
stances where the lawyer/drafter may properly designate herself as fidu-
ciary. The issue we explore in this section is whether the lawyer/
fiduciary should also serve as the lawyer for the fiduciary.
143. See id.
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The questions presented to lawyers serving in such dual capacities are:
(1) how much compensation is the lawyer entitled; (2) what are the ethi-
cal problems arising from dual capacity designation; and (3) if there are
pertinent ethical standards, how might they be enforced?
Keeping these problem areas in mind throughout this section, we ex-
amine the benefits as well as the risks and abuses that accompany the
designation of the lawyer/fiduciary as counsel for the fiduciary. We also
look at the regulation of fees under the common law and by the various
states. After examining ethics opinions and case law, we present options
regarding the possible regulation of lawyers serving in a dual capacity.
1. Potential Benefits of Having the Lawyer/Fiduciary Also Serve as
Lawyer for the Fiduciary
Arguably, one of the most compelling reasons to have lawyer/fiducia-
ries serve as their own legal counsel is to provide the client with the most
efficient and cost-effective estate administration. If a lawyer is familiar
with the estate and already serving as its executor, that lawyer is presum-
ably qualified to serve as her own counsel. Indeed, the non-legal duties of
the executor may be very difficult to distinguish from the legal duties that
are carried out by the lawyer for the executor. We discuss below the
complications of fees and compensation and note simply that in most
cases a lawyer has the requisite skills to serve as counsel to herself as
executor. The use of another lawyer may entail more time, effort, and
fees. One commentator believes, in fact, that
except in rare instances where the aid of a legal specialist is required
such as a case involving actual litigation or one requiring sophisticated
post death estate tax planning, the attorney who accepts an appoint-
ment as a fiduciary should be required to provide the legal services
himself rather than to employ additional counsel.144
Another perhaps more obvious benefit--especially in the case of the
lawyer/drafter being appointed fiduciary and then also serving as her
own legal counsel-is the fulfillment of the client/testator's expectations.
While many clients are aware of the need for and function of an estate
executor, they may not think of the need for a lawyer for the executor.
Many clients come to the estate planning lawyer expecting that the same
lawyer will take care of the estate-before and after the client/testator's
death.
In some cases the client/testator may well understand the roles of both
the executor and counsel for the executor and specifically desire the same
lawyer to carry out both roles. In such a situation, the lawyer most likely
may fulfill both roles as long as the desires of the client have been ex-
pressed, and it is clear that the decision was not a result of the lawyer's
144. Levin, supra note 83, at 50.
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undue influence or overreaching.1 45
2. Potential Risks and Abuses When the Lawyer/Fiduciary Also
Serves as Lawyer for the Fiduciary
The risks and abuses that potentially may arise when the lawyer serves
in this dual capacity center on issues concerning fees and compensation,
the lawyer serving in the client's best interests, and the lawyer's duty to
use independent judgment in representing the client.
The main duty of loyalty of a lawyer is to serve her client's best inter-
ests. Once appointed as fiduciary, the lawyer owes her client a duty of
loyalty both as a fiduciary and as a lawyer. As fiduciary, the lawyer may
also have to serve the best interests of the beneficiaries. A lawyer as fidu-
ciary may certainly carry out these duties. Although, once that lawyer/
fiduciary also selects herself as attorney for the fiduciary, a serious di-
lemma arises: is that lawyer's duty of loyalty to herself as fiduciary or to
the estate because she is the estate's fiduciary? Furthermore, is that law-
yer serving her own self-interest by appointing herself as counsel, and
thus possibly assuring herself more future fees and influence? Has the
lawyer exercised-or is she capable of exercising-the independent judg-
ment (required of her by the ethical standards) when she is also counsel
for the fiduciary?
The situation becomes far more complicated when the scrivener
designates herself as both fiduciary and attorney for the fiduciary. One
immediate question is whether it was the client who actually made such a
designation? As one commentator notes, it is "unlikely that a testator
would know about the role of an attorney in the probate of an estate,
much less think it desirable to include a specific appointment at the time
the will is drafted."'' 46
Thus, such a designation may involve an improper conflict of interest.
The lawyer/scrivener must provide the client/testator with independent
legal advice. By designating herself, however, the attorney may simply
be promoting her own self-interest by securing future employment for
herself.
Furthermore, there is no legitimate purpose in naming an attorney for
the estate in the will. The designation is not binding, particularly be-
cause courts have long recognized that the estate's executor has the right
to choose his own legal counsel.' 47
145. See In re Will of Corya, 563 N.Y.S.2d 581, 585 (Sur. Ct. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 572 N.Y.S.2d 51 (App. Div. 1991).
146. Johnston, supra note 64, at 103.
147. According to the American Bar Association in an ethics opinion,
[t]his committee has specially held in Decision 244A in the Appendix of the
Opinions of this Committee that drawing a will does not carry the right to
represent the estate of the testator regardless of any direction in the will, and
that a lawyer has no vested interest in representing the estate of one who [sic]
will he has drawn, and that the executor is entirely free to select any counsel he
may wish.
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Improper solicitation is another ethical issue that arises when the law-
yer/fiduciary chooses herself as her own legal counsel. Was the client
aware of the possibility that the attorney could designate herself for such
a role? Was such a designation inserted in the will without making clear
its implications to the client/testator? Johnston points out that
[t]he insertion of a clause appointing the drafting attorney as executor
may not put the testator on notice that the draftsman is seeking future
business, and the designation of an attorney to provide legal services to
the estate is even less likely to be detected as solicitation, because the
testators generally do not understand the meaning of such a legal posi-
tion or that an appointment in advance is hardly necessary or desirable
in the way that the selection of an executor is. 14
There is a concern that when the lawyer/fiduciary also acts as her own
lawyer, she, and the persons for whom she is acting as fiduciary, are de-
nied the benefit of the perspective and advice of another lawyer. The
fiduciary must serve the best interests of the beneficiaries while maintain-
ing her duty of loyalty to the estate. When a lawyer serves as fiduciary,
she must select as legal counsel to the estate the lawyer best suited to the
job, and not herself merely because she is also a lawyer.
Finally, in some states dual representation is not cost effective for the
client. In these states, attorneys can receive fees for acting as fiduciary
and as lawyer for the fiduciary. This is known as "double dipping." Par-
ticularly in states where both the fiduciary and the attorney receive a
fee-which, as a minimum, is a percentage of asset value-there is a sig-
nificant risk that the lawyer/fiduciary also serving as the lawyer will re-
ceive excessive total compensation. Indeed, lawyers can earn so much
when working in estate administration that there is a tendency to un-
dercharge during will preparation. 149
3. Regulation of the Lawyer/Fiduciary Serving as Lawyer to the
Fiduciary
a. The Lawyer/Fiduciary's Entitlement to Compensation as Fiduciary
and as Lawyer for the Fiduciary
At common law fiduciaries were not compensated. Moreover, histori-
cally most jurisdictions prohibited lawyers from collecting dual fees as
both fiduciary and attorney because common law prohibited divided loy-
alties. Today, usually by statute, fiduciaries are entitled to compensation.
When lawyers serve in the dual capacity of fiduciary and lawyer for the
fiduciary, they may-at least in some states-be entitled to dual
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 602 (1963).
148. Johnston, supra note 64, at 105.
149. See Johnston, supra note 64, at 102. There is also the related problem of the
safekeeping of wills. After the death of the testator, families come in to the lawyer/
scrivener and simply assume that she will also serve as lawyer for the estate. See Levin,
supra note 83, at 50.
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compensation. 150
Statutes generally use one of two methods to set fiduciary compensa-
tion: (1) a "reasonable" fee standard; or (2) a fee schedule method, based
upon a percentage of the value of the estate. 15 1 There is also a recent
trend towards basing compensation on an hourly basis for actual services
rendered.152 However, states still differ on the regulation of dual fees.
In California, the fiduciary/lawyer may not receive compensation in
both capacities unless the will specifically so provides. 153 The California
courts scrutinize even more closely provisions allowing a double fee
when the lawyer also drafted the will.' 4 The California Probate Code
section 10804 provides that a lawyer/personal representative may receive
compensation as the personal representative, but not compensation for
services as the estate attorney "unless the court specifically approves the
right to the compensation in advance and finds that the arrangement is to
150. See generally L.S Tellier, Annotation, Right of executor or administrator to extra
compensation for legal services rendered by him, 65 A.L.R.2d 809, 810 (1959) ("[T]he
majority rule appears to be that in the absence of statute otherwise providing, an executor
or administrator is not generally entitled to extra compensation for legal services ren-
dered by him in connection with the estate.").
151. According to deFuria:
[W]ith respect to the reasonable standard, the reasonableness of a fee usually is
determined by court order, which in all likelihood is based upon a percentage of
the estate as a starting point. Hence, the reasonableness standard is more of a
formal rather than a substantive distinction. In both cases, the fee actually
awarded to the attorney-fiduciary often bears less than a realistic relationship to
the actual amount of work involved.
deFuria, supra note 59, at 306.
For examples of the reasonable fee standard approach, see Unif. Prob. Code § 3-719
(West 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-719 (1987); D.C. Code Ann. § 20-751 (1989); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 733.617 (West Supp. 1993); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110§ para. 27-1 (Smith-Hurd
1978 & Supp. 1992); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-23-3 (1984); N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act Law
§ 2307 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1994) (reasonable fee and schedule); R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 33-14-8 (1984); W.Va. Code § 44-4-12 (1982).
For examples of the fee schedule method, see Del Ch. Ct. R. 192 (1991); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 473.153 (Vernon 1992); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 58, § 527 (West 1965 & Supp. 1994);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 116.173 (1984); Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 241 (West Supp. 1993).
152. For example, the court in In re Will of Corya stated:
Counsel fees, particularly where there is no retainer agreement, should be as-
sessed on a quantum meruit basis and in accordance with the general criteria
established by the courts ... to wit: the time spent, the difficulties involved in
the matter, the nature of the services rendered, the amount involved, the profes-
sional standing of counsel, and the results obtained.
563 N.Y.S.2d 581, 587 (Sur. Ct. 1990) rev'd on other grounds, 572 N.Y.S.2d 51 (App.
Div. 1991).
153. See In re Estate of Thompson, 328 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Cal. 1958). Laurino finds it troub-
ling to forego the common law rule that no person in whom fiduciary duties are vested
shall make a profit of them by employing himself. See Laurino, supra note 68, 1 1600.
However, even in those jurisdictions still following the common law rule, there is an
exception of which Laurino approves: legal compensation should be provided "to the
attorney/fiduciary where the will expressly directs that in the event that the attorney/
executor also acts as his own attorney, he shall be entitled to extra compensation in the
form of a legal fee." Id. % 1601.3(c).
154. See In re Thompson, 328 P.2d at 2-3.
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the advantage, benefit, and best interests of the decedent's estate.""'
Mississippi and Missouri are among the states that do not allow dual
compensation. In Mississippi, the lawyer/fiduciary may choose which
fee to take. 156 Moreover, the fees must be "reasonable" and approved by
the court. For instance, "[w]here the executor, administrator, or guard-
ian acts also as attorney, the court may allow such executor, administra-
tor, or guardian credit for his reasonable compensation as attorney in lieu
of his compensation as executor, administrator, or guardian."' 5
Missouri bases the personal representative's compensation on a fixed
percentage scale.1 58 When the personal representative's reasonable com-
pensation is in excess of that provided by the schedule, the court must
approve such increase to insure that the compensation is "reasonable and
adequate."1 9 There are no attorney's fees allowed for the attorney/per-
sonal representative unless authorized by the court or consented to by all
the affected heirs and devisees. ' Additionally, "when one member of a
law firm or professional corporation serves as personal representative of
the estate and another member of the same law firm or professional cor-
poration serves as the attorney for the estate, only one fee as set forth in
subsection 1 of this section shall be allowed."'16'
A majority of states allow dual compensation for the executor and the
attorney for the estate.1 62 Most of these states limit compensation to a
"reasonable" amount which is further conditioned on court approval. 63
Louis D. Laurino suggests that in New York, which allows dual compen-
sation, the actual practice is that the safeguards of reasonable compensa-
tion and judicial discretion are almost non-existent.16
Recently, dual compensation has been challenged in New York as well
155. California Probate Code § 10804 (1993) (emphasis omitted). The term "estate
attorney" includes the associates, partners, and attorneys of counsel with the law firm of
the attorney retained by the personal representative as estate attorney, and also associ-
ates, partners, and attorneys of counsel with other law firms associated in the estate pro-
ceeding with the firm of that attorney, if the peronal representative will share in the
compensation that would be paid to the law firm.
Recent legislation in California prohibits lawyers from serving as both the executor and
attorney for the executor, except in certain circumstances approved by the court in ad-
vance. The legislation requires the court to make sure the arrangement is to the advan-
tage, benefit and best interests of the decedent's estate. See Daniel B. Kennedy, Estate
Lawyers Mount Bicoastal Battle, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 30, 30.
156. See Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-281 (1972).
157. Id,
158. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 473.153 (Vernon 1992).
159. See id.
160. See id § 473.153 § 3.
161. Id
162. See Laurino, supra note 68, 1600.
163. See id. 1601.3(D).
164. See deFuria, supra note 59, at 304-08 & n.174 (discussing the ethical problems of
fee charging by attorneys acting as testamentary fiduciaries); Laurino, supra note 68, C
1601.3(D); see generally Fiduciary and Probate Counsel Fees in the Wake of Goldfarb, 13
Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 238, 249-50 (1978) (discussing the practice and regulation of
dual representation within different jurisdictions); Link, supra note 38, at 30-38 (discuss-
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as in California. The New York bill provided that lawyers acting in dual
capacities would have their statutory executor's commission cut in
half.16
5
The bill met with strong opposition from the New York County Law-
yers Association. 6 6 Members of that association proposed a counter
statute based on the necessity of disclosure to the client rather than the
loss of income by the lawyer. 161 Under this bill, the lawyer must disclose
three things to a testator who wants to name that lawyer as executor of
his will:
1) [e]xecutors are entitled to a commission, based upon a sliding scale;
2) the statutory rates of commission; and 3) the lawyer or his firm is
entitled to a fee for legal services rendered in addition to the executor's
commission. 168
After disclosure, the testator may choose whether or not to designate the
lawyer as executor. 69 Moreover, the court has the discretion to fix the
executor's commission if the lawyer fails to disclose. 170
Finally, we should note that the ABA Section of Real Property, Pro-
bate, and Trust Law suggested in its 1973 Statement of Principles Re-
garding Probate Practices and Expenses that the practice of lawyers
serving in such dual roles is "in the public interest" and explicitly ap-
proved of the practice.17 '
b. Ethical Provisions
Certain ethical provisions may place constraints on the lawyer serving
as both an executor and the lawyer/fiduciary's lawyer. As noted earlier,
there is no specific provision in the Model Rules prohibiting an attorney
from serving as a fiduciary. Similarly, there is no prohibition in the
Model Rules against a lawyer serving in this dual capacity.
EC 5-6 of the Model Code provides that a lawyer must not "con-
sciously influence" a client to name that lawyer in an instrument as exec-
utor, trustee, or lawyer. As discussed above, the term "consciously
influence" is helplessly vague. Under the Code, however, one supposes
ing the issue of dual compensation for attorneys acting as personal representatives and
counsel for an estate).
Nonetheless, there is a common law rule in New York limiting lawyers' rights to fees
when they designate themselves as executors. See In re Estate of Weinstock, 351 N.E.2d
647, 649 (N.Y. 1976).






171. The same ABA section published in 1992 Principles for Attorneys Acting in Other
Fiduciary Roles, A.B.A. Sect. Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. L. (Oct. 16, 1992) (providing that
"[t]he attorney-fiduciary should comply with such ethical principles regarding fiduciary
fees and expenses as may be applicable under state laws") (on file with Fordham Law
Review).
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that if a lawyer does not exert undue influence over a client, then the
lawyer may be properly named as both executor and lawyer for the exec-
utor. One commentator points out that EC 5-6 does not assist with the
virtually impossible determination of whether the draftsman or the client
first suggested appointing the attorney."7 2 Additionally, even if the
draftsman suggested appointment first, EC 5-6 does not help with deter-
mining whether that necessarily constitutes improper influence in the
particular circumstances. 17
3
An ABA ethics opinion prior to the promulgation of the Model Code
held that the "customary and regular inclusion of provisions in wills di-
recting the retention of the services of the attorney drawing the will,
without the specific request or suggestion of the client is clearly in viola-
tion of Canon 11 and improper."174 But this opinion also emphasizes
that the executor has the prerogative of naming his own counsel. 7 5
Thus, there is no ethical violation when a client freely names an attorney
to these roles, or when a client properly names an attorney as executor
and then the attorney chooses herself as counsel.
DR 2-106(A) of the Model Code provided that a lawyer "shall not
enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly exces-
sive fee." 176 DR 2-106(B) provided that a fee is "clearly excessive when,
after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left
with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable
fee."' 177 The factors that determine the reasonableness of the fee are: the
time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty of the questions in-
volved; the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; the likeli-
hood that acceptance will preclude other employment; the fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; the amount
involved and the results obtained; the time limitations imposed by the
client or by the circumstances; the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; the experience, reputation, and ability of the
lawyer or lawyers performing the services, and whether the fee is fixed or
contingent. 1
78
The ethical consideration EC 2-17 made an interesting attempt to deal
with the determination of a proper fee. According to EC 2-17:
The determination of a proper fee requires consideration of the inter-
172. See Johnston, supra note 64, at 103.
173. See id.
174. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 602 (1963).
175. See id.
176. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106(A) (1980).
177. Id at DR 2-106(B).
178. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a) (1992). deFuria argues that
attorney/drafters who appoint themselves fiduciaries ignore the ethical rules when they
determine their fees because the Model Code and the Model Rules say to avoid excessive
fees. See deFuria, supra note 59, at 307. Because both the Model Code and Model Rules
use similar factors for determining "reasonable," deFuria concludes that a percentage
method could be used under either set of rules to arrive at a reasonable fee. See id.
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ests of both client and lawyer. A lawyer should not charge more than
a reasonable fee, for excessive cost of legal service would deter laymen
from utilizing the legal system in protection of their rights. Further-
more, an excessive charge abuses the professional relationship between
lawyer and client. On the other hand, adequate compensation is neces-
sary in order to enable the lawyer to serve his client effectively and to
preserve the integrity and independence of the profession.
179
Model Rule 1.5 replaced DR 2-106 by stating affirmatively that "[a]
lawyer's fee shall be reasonable."'1 0 Reasonableness here is based on fac-
tors almost identical to those listed above for the Code. Under this rule,
however, when the lawyer serving in dual capacities receives both attor-
ney's fees and the statutory personal representative fee, the legal fee may
be excessive.1
8 1
Several other ethics provisions must be considered when discussing a
lawyer serving in a dual capacity. Pervasive problems include those of
solicitation and undue influence. When the lawyer names herself fiduci-
ary because that fiduciary has the right to name her own counsel as fidu-
ciary, it is almost impossible to know what went on between client and
lawyer. 182
Rule 7.3(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not by in-person or live
telephone contact solicit professional employment from a prospective cli-
ent with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relation-
ship when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain."1 83 Thus, if a lawyer has a prior relationship with the
client and is not engaging herself for her own pecuniary gain, there ap-
pears to be no violation.
Even the comment to Model Rule 7.3(a) indicates that there is little
likelihood that a lawyer would engage in abusive practices against an
individual with whom the lawyer has a prior personal or professional
relationship, or where the lawyer is motivated by considerations other
than the lawyer's pecuniary gain." 4 Thus, the general prohibition in
7.3(a) would not be applicable.
The rule, however, does not give any indication of what a lawyer's
consideration of pecuniary gain might be. As noted earlier, the loss
leader practice in estate planning is common. That is, there is little cost
179. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-17 (1980).
180. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.59(a) (1992).
181. See generally id. (discussing factors determining attorneys fees).
182. See Johnston, supra note 64, at 90.
183. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 (1992).
184. The Comment to Rule 7.3 provides:
There is far less likelihood that a lawyer would engage in abusive practices
against an individual with whom the lawyer has a prior personal or professional
relationship or where the lawyer is motivated by considerations other than the
lawyer's pecuniary gain. Consequently, the general prohibition in Rule 7.3(a)
and the requirements of Rule 7.3(c) are not applicable in those situations.
Id. at Rule 7.3 cmt.
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for the initial drafting of a will in the hope of later, more lucrative in-
volvement in the estate administration. Even if the lawyer is not ap-
pointed fiduciary, the hope is that the family fiduciary will turn to the
drafting lawyer for future counsel. Are these two common practices un-
ethical because the lawyer engaging in them may also consider her own
pecuniary gain?18 5
Model Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a) touch upon similar matters in the con-
text of conflict of interest. Rule 1.7(b) states:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1)
the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation.' 6
The lawyer is not to represent someone if her own interests affect her
representation of the client. Thus, when the lawyer serves in a dual ca-
pacity, if the lawyer believes she can maintain her independent judgment,
there is no ethical violation.
The comment to Model Rule 1.7(b) provides that the "lawyer's own
interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representa-
tion of a client. For example, a lawyer's need for income should not lead
the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled competently and
at a reasonable fee." '187
If a lawyer engages in such a practice to secure future employment for
herself, then this is an ethical violation. Yet, if a client-after disclo-
sure-still wants that lawyer to so serve, the lawyer properly may serve
without violating Model Rule 1.7(b).
Rule 1.8(a) appears to impose similar ethical constraints: "A lawyer
shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest
,,188
Both these rules are tempered by Model Rule 2.1: "In representing a
client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice."' 189 The client depends upon the lawyer for such
advice. If the lawyer is so bound by her own interest in compensation
that she cannot advise the client in the client's best interests, then that
lawyer should not take on the dual capacity obligations.
185. See Levin, supra note 83, at 53.
186. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b) (1992).
187. Id. at Rule 1.7(b) cmt.
188. Id. at Rule 1.8(a).
189. Id at Rule 2.1.
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4. State Law and Ethics Rules Regulating Options and Analysis of
the Options
a. Lawyer/Fiduciary Appointment as Lawyer for the Fiduciary
(i) Option I
One option would be an absolute prohibition against the lawyer serv-
ing as lawyer when she is already the fiduciary. Such a prohibition
would eliminate the following problems: a lawyer not exercising in-
dependent judgment in selecting the best qualified lawyer; providing the
lawyer with additional reasons to seek being named fiduciary (as she can
then later name herself lawyer, too); not having the perspective and ad-
vice of another lawyer; and the "double dipping" issue.
An absolute prohibition, however, would prevent the lawyer from
serving in a dual role even in appropriate cases, such as where special
independent counsel is unnecessary and where costs are lower without
separate counsel.
Furthermore, in such appropriate cases, there is no ethical violation,
especially if the lawyer has made full disclosure to the client and the
lawyer is satisfied that she is not acting for her own pecuniary gain.
(ii) Option II
Another option is an absolute prohibition against serving as lawyer
only when the lawyer/fiduciary was the scrivener of the instrument nam-
ing herself as fiduciary. According to Laurino, lawyers appear to name
themselves as fiduciary in cases not seeming to need their special skills,
mostly in states permitting dual compensation. 90 In such cases, Option
II would reduce the number of cases where lawyers are named as fiducia-
ries. However, it would also prevent lawyers from serving in dual roles
even in those cases where it would be more efficient and cost effective to
actually have the lawyer serving in both roles.
Options I and II assume the enforceability of a state law prohibiting
the lawyer/fiduciary from serving also as lawyer. It is questionable, how-
ever, whether such a law would be enforceable. Testators have the right
to name their own fiduciaries, and may even name the lawyer for the
fiduciary, depending on the circumstances of the case.' 91
190. See Laurino, supra note 68, 1601.2.
191. In In re Estate of Thompson, the California Supreme Court expressly avoided the
public policy considerations concerning the testator's designation that the named fiduci-
ary, who is a lawyer, may also serve as his own lawyer. See 328 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Cal. 1958).
The court, however, did hold that where a testatrix imposes her faith and trust in her
designated executor (who is also an attorney) by expressly providing for his additional
compensation if he also acts as his own attorney, the purpose of the policy which might
otherwise restrict self-dealing transactions cannot be accomplished and the policy is no
longer a controlling consideration, especially in view of the added safeguard of a statutory
standard by which services performed for the estate may be objectively evaluated. See id.
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(iii) Option III
When a lawyer is appointed fiduciary (which presumes the appoint-
ment has not been voided by a finding of undue influence by the probate
judge), the lawyer/fiduciary may employ herself as counsel, subject to all
restrictions imposed by applicable state fiduciary law and the Model
Rules.
Option III has the benefit of not being an absolute prohibition while
still providing a variety of safeguards. For example, if a lawyer commits
malpractice that might have been avoided if the client had advice from
independent separate counsel, then she will still be liable for malpractice.
A negative aspect of this option is the vagueness of the Model Rules
that might govern the lawyer serving in a dual capacity. As noted above,
the rules do not distinguish whether the lawyer was appointed by the
client/testator with sufficient disclosure. Even though Option III ac-
knowledges that a judge will make a determination of the validity of the
appointment of the lawyer as fiduciary, there should be stronger ethical
standards in place that would discourage lawyers from even considering
the avoidance of disclosure.
b. The Lawyer/Fiduciary's Right to Dual Compensation When She
Serves as Lawyer for the Fiduciary
The California, Missouri, and Mississippi common law prohibitions
against dual fees for the personal representative-unless there is other
specification in the will-may reduce the number of cases where the law-
yer/scrivener names herself as fiduciary. In addition, these prohibitions
will certainly protect against the excessive compensation of double dip-
ping, at least to the same lawyer. 192 However, such a prohibition may
still lead to overall excessive compensation because the lawyer/fiduciary
will now often hire separate counsel, and there will be two fees to pay.
This is a particular problem in states like California where the executor's
commissions and the attorney's fees are a statutory percentage without
regard to the services actually rendered in the particular case. Such a
prohibition may also prevent a lawyer from receiving fair overall com-
pensation in cases where the lawyer serving in dual roles is best for the
client.
The best approach is to allow both the lawyer/fiduciary and the law-
yers for the fiduciary, whether it be the lawyer/fiduciary or someone else,
to receive reasonable compensation after a full report and hearing by the
court. If the lawyer/fiduciary should have performed routine services
that were needlessly performed by the lawyer, then the court should re-
duce the fiduciary's compensation accordingly. Perhaps the fiduciary
should have the burden to justify the use of a lawyer. Lawyers should be
allowed to serve in dual capacities and receive reasonable compensation
192. See In re Will of Corya, 563 N.Y.S.2d 581 (Sur. Ct. 1990), rey'd on other grounds,
572 N.Y.S.2d 51 (App. Div. 1991) (statutory percentage fees were found to be excessive).
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for both roles when they can show to a reviewing court the work done for
such compensation.19
3
c. Ethics Rules When the Lawyer/Fiduciary is Also the Lawyer
As pointed out above, there are a number of current Model Rules that
appear to be pertinent to both the appointment and the conduct of the
lawyer who is also the fiduciary. The question is whether these various
provisions should be combined into a situation-specific ethical rule.
We suggest the following situation-specific rule:
When a lawyer is appointed to serve as an executor, administrator,
trustee, guardian, conservator, or in a similar fiduciary capacity, in de-
ciding whom to employ as attorney(s) for the fiduciary, the lawyer/
fiduciary shall consider only the best interests of the fiduciary estate
and all the persons interested therein, including the necessity for spe-
cialized, independent legal assistance, and the comparative overall
costs involved. In those cases where the lawyer/fiduciary also serves
as attorney for the fiduciary/fiduciary estate, or employs the firm with
which she is associated to serve as the attorney, she shall not have the
attorney(s) perform legal services that she reasonably could perform as
part of her duties as the fiduciary.
A client/testator may appoint a lawyer as fiduciary and even designate
in a testamentary instrument that the lawyer/fiduciary serve as lawyer
for the fiduciary. The client/testator may also establish the fees to be
paid, or not to be paid, to the person serving in these dual capacities.
However, the client should be well informed of the situation and the con-
sequences of such a designation. In order to ensure that the client under-
stands, the lawyer should fully disclose all the consequences, including
costs to the estate and compensation to the lawyer, and suggest in-
dependent counsel, especially in the case of the lawyer also acting as
scrivener.
There should be court approval any time a lawyer is appointed as fidu-
ciary and when the lawyer/fiduciary also acts as her own legal counsel.
Fees should be statutorily defined, but there should not be an absolute
prohibition against the lawyer/fiduciary receiving dual compensation
when she also serves as her own lawyer.
The current Model Rules do not adequately address the ethical issues
that concern lawyers serving in dual capacities. Thus, there should be a
situation-specific rule, such as the one we have suggested above, that
stresses the importance of the attorney serving only the interests of the
client, including the performance of routine legal services as part of her
duties as the fiduciary. This would avoid the possibility of the lawyer
serving her own interests, particularly her own pecuniary interests.
193. For the recent controversy in New York over the proposed legislation prohibiting
statutory fees for both the lawyer and fiduciary see Kennedy, supra note 155.
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C. Possible "Conflicts Rules" Problems When the Lawyer Serves
Solely as a Fiduciary
Conflict of interest problems are of great concern to lawyers practicing
in the area of estate planning and administration. 94 In this section we
examine the application of the Model Rules-in particular Rule 1.7 (gen-
eral rule for conflicts), Rule 1.9 (former client), Rule 2.1 (advisor), and
Rule 2.2 (intermediary)-to the conflict of interest problems that arise
when the lawyer serves solely as fiduciary.' 95
We focus here on several hypothetical situations in an effort to deter-
mine: (1) the effect of the conflict of interest rules upon lawyers serving
in various fiduciary roles; and (2) the possibility of changes in the rules to
better accommodate the problems arising when lawyers serve as fiducia-
ies. Virtually all commentators agree that the ethical rules were devel-
oped to respond to the issues arising when the lawyer engages in
litigation for her client. And even though the Model Rules (unlike the
Model Code) attempt to provide rules for the lawyer serving in different
roles (advocate, advisor, intermediary), they fail to address adequately
the specific ethical issues faced by lawyers serving as fiduciaries, espe-
cially in a non-litigation context.' 96
When a lawyer is serving solely as fiduciary, is she considered to be
"representing a client," so that the conflicts of interest rules potentially
apply? Nothing in the Model Rules or Code specifically addresses this
194. See Patricia Brosterhous, Conflicts of Interest in Estate Planning and Administra-
tion, Tr. & Est., June 1984, at 18; Mercer D. Tate, Handling Conflicts of Interest That
May Occur in an Estate Planning Practice, 16 Est. Plan. 32 (1989).
195. We focus here on the problems faced by the lawyer when serving as fiduciary.
However, much of the work done on conflicts of interest issues for lawyers generally is
pertinent. See Steven H. Goldberg, The Former Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad
Move in Pursuit of an EthicalAnomaly, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 227 (1987); Kevin McMunigal,
Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 823 (1992); Mil-
lard L. Midonick, Attorney-Client Conflicts and Confidences in Trusts and Estates, 35
Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 215 (1980); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simulta-
neous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion
and Controversy, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1982); Debra B. Perschbacher & Rex R.
Perschbacher, Enter at Your Own Risk- The Initial Consultation & Conflicts of Interest, 3
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 689 (1990); Marc I. Steinberg & Timothy U. Sharpe, Attorney Con-
flicts of Interest: The Need for a Coherent Framework, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1 (1990);
Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 Harv. L Rev.
1244 (1981).
196. According to Mercer D. Tate, "under the prior Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity (CPR), dating from the early 1970s in most jurisdictions, there were few provisions
that were specifically relevant to estate planning attorneys. The CPR primarily addressed
litigators; the non-litigating lawyer received little guidance." Tate, supra note 194, at 32.
Jeffrey N. Pennell states that "[t]he ABA Model Rules and Model Code are indicative
of the problems that confront all estate planning professions. These dictates clearly were
written by, and for, litigators; in many respects they do not anticipate and therefore apply
poorly (or not at all) to estate planning engagements." Jeffrey N. Pennell, Ethics Con-
cerns are Being Addressed, Tr. & Est., Jan. 1992, at 14; see also Avery, supra note 48
(arguing that the ABA and state supreme courts should develop ethical rules for such
lawyer specialists like estate planners).
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question. However, several authorities and some courts have contended
that the ethics rules apply to any and all professional conduct of lawyers.
When a lawyer who holds herself out as a lawyer engages in other activi-
ties, she is still held to the same ethical standards required of lawyers
acting as lawyers.1
97
A fundamental duty implied in the conflict of interest provisions in the
Model Rules, especially in Rule 1.7, is the lawyer's duty of loyalty. A
lawyer must always serve in the best interests of the client. The duty of
loyalty is also a fundamental duty of a fiduciary. Therefore, apparently
the assumption by some courts has been that when the lawyer serves as
fiduciary she is nonetheless representing that client as a lawyer, and will
thus be subject to disciplinary action as a lawyer for misconduct as a
fiduciary. 1 98
1. Hypotheticals
We look now briefly at several hypothetical situations that attempt to
illustrate some of the potential difficulties lawyers serving as fiduciaries
face when they deal with multiple client representations.
a. Hypothetical I
Let us assume that a lawyer ("L") is appointed as the guardian/con-
servator or agent for an individual client and must make a decision in her
fiduciary capacity that could possibly affect other family members.
When L also represents other family members of that client, conflicts
under Rule 1.7(b) can arise that would force L to withdraw from repre-
senting the other family members. 19 9 While in some cases this may in-
197. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. But see The Florida Bar (In re
Amendment to the Integration Rule and Bylaws Respecting Clients' Security Fund), where
the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to ex-
tend the Clients' Security Fund's coverage to misappropriations by attorneys acting in
fiduciary capacities unrelated to an attorney-client relationship. See 346 So. 2d 537, 537
(Fla. 1977). The court refused to extend this coverage explaining that "[t]he Clients'
Security Fund was established to protect persons victimized as a result of an attorney-
client relationship. The Legislature has already acted to protect persons who must use
individual fiduciaries, and the reach of the law quite clearly encompasses persons serving
as fiduciaries who happen to be attorneys." Id. at 538. The court apparently implies here
that a lawyer also serving as a fiduciary will be held to both the ethical standards for
lawyers as well as the statutory regulations regarding fiduciaries. The court did not ad-
dress whether the breach of one standard implies per se the breach of the other.
Others have been concerned with the protection of lawyers serving as fiduciaries. See
Lawyers Serving as Executors and Trustees, supra note 65, at 764-67; Principles for Attor-
neys Acting in Other Fiduciary Roles, supra note 53.
198. See Landis, supra note 43, at 658. Landis states:
[A]lthough a personal representative who is a layman may be liable to an estate
in a civil suit, the attorney who is a personal representative of a decedent's
estate may, in addition to any civil liability, be subject to disciplinary action as
an attorney for his misconduct in the capacity of a personal representative.
ld.
199. Rule 1.7 provides:
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deed be desirable, in many other cases the family as a group wants that
lawyer to advise them as a family unit, instead of serving as a zealous
advocate for one family member. In such instances, the interests of eve-
ryone involved are intertwined, but not necessarily adverse. As Avery
suggests, the lawyer/fiduciary often does not really represent solely one
individual, but must be able, as is often expected by family members, to
serve in the best interests of the entire family.2"
Rule 1.9201 would prevent L from being the guardian/conservator
without first obtaining the consent of the other potentially affected family
members, if L had previously represented those family members. One
possible remedy would be to change Rule 1.9 to allow the fiduciary to
continue serving in this capacity regarding the issue without the consent
of anyone else.
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another cli-
ent or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected; and
(2) the client consents after [full disclosure and] consultation. When
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken,
the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of
the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 (1992).
200. See Avery, supra note 48, at 12.
201. Rule 1.9 provides:
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the inter-
ests of the former client unless the former client consents after
consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a sub-
stantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly
was associated had previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter, unless the for-
mer client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose
present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter:
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage
of the former client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or
require with respect to a client, or when the information has be-
come generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6
or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9 (1992).
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b. Hypothetical 11
Assume the clients are husband and wife ("H" and "W") who have
children. L has previously represented H's business, as well as H and W
jointly on tax issues and estate planning. Moreover, L has also provided
H and W's children with legal advice on various issues from time to time
and has drafted their wills.
H and W each have reciprocal wills with maximum credit shelter and
QTIP trusts, with the remainder over to H and W's issue equally. When
H dies, W has no expertise or interest in business, and the children all
reside out of state. In such a case, the lawyer as fiduciary serves W, the
life beneficiary of the trust and not the trust itself.
Assume, however, that L is appointed guardian of H's estate when H
becomes incompetent; or, alternatively, as agent under H's general dura-
ble power of attorney. Clearly, the fiduciary's duty runs to H as ward.
But what are the fiduciary's duties to W and the children?0 2
Assume that H's interests are to sell the business, but a son of H (and a
former client of L) wants to keep it in the family's possession so that he
can run the business. How would the son's interests in the business af-
fect, for example, H's Medicaid eligibility planning? From the overall
family standpoint, it may be best to make gifts to the children of H's
money, except for H's exempt assets. However, regarding H's medical
care, it may be best for H not to qualify for Medicaid, but to keep all her
money to pay for her own medical costs.
Under Rule 1.7(b), a lawyer shall not represent a client, if representa-
tion may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibility to another,
unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation.
Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider,
recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client
because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. Rule 1.7(b) ad-
dresses such a situation. A possible conflict does not itself preclude the
representation. The critical issues are the likelihood that a conflict will
develop and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the law-
yer's independent judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose
courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the cli-
ent. The lawyer should consider whether the client wishes to accommo-
date the other interests involved.
202. According to the court in Fickett v. Superior Court,
when an attorney undertakes to represent the guardian of an incompetent, he
assumes a relationship not only with the guardian but also with the ward. If
[the lawyer] knew or should have known that the guardian was acting adversely
to his ward's interest, the possibility of frustrating the whole purpose of the
guardianship became foreseeable as did the possibility of injury to the ward.
558 P.2d 988, 990 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular
Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, I Geo. J. Legal Ethics 15, 18 (1987)
(quoting the above passage).
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A nagging question is whether there is a "substantial risk" that respon-
sibilities to the other client (e.g., H's son) might impair L's independent
judgment regarding ward H? If such a conflict arises after representation
has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representa-
tion under Rule 1.16(a)(1).20 3 When more than one client is involved
and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after representation,
Rules 1.9 and 2.2 dictate whether the lawyer may continue to represent
any of the clients.
In our extended hypothetical, if there is a conflict between the interests
of H and the son (whom L also represents as a lawyer), regarding the sale
of the business, for example, Rule 1.9(a) would apply. It provides: "A
lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not there-
after represent another person in the same or a substantially related mat-
ter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests
of the former client unless the former client consents after consulta-
tion.' '2 ' Therefore, under this Rule, and Rules 1.7 and 1.16(a), L must
withdraw from representing the son in this matter. Also, L cannot, as
guardian, represent the ward H regarding the sale of the business unless
the son consents after consultation.
For the purposes of the conflicts rules, in a case where L represents
one party as lawyer (e.g., the son) and another party as only a fiduciary
(e.g., H as guardian), it is not reasonable to suppose that H is not L's
client because L does not represent H in her capacity as a lawyer. This is
so because to both son and H, L is acting as a paid, professional fiduci-
ary. As discussed in earlier sections of this Article, H probably chose L
to serve as his fiduciary precisely because L is a lawyer. Thus, H himself
most probably believes himself to be L's client even when L is serving
only as guardian.
If L is serving as guardian/conservator or agent, and also represents as
lawyer one or more other persons (e.g., son), and a conflict arises under
Rule 1.7(b) that forces L to withdraw from representing the son, L
should be allowed to continue as guardian and to handle matters where
there was a conflict between H and son (e.g., Medicaid issue and sale of
business) without the son's consent. Thus, an amendment to Rule 1.9
would clarify that the phrase "shall not thereafter represent another per-
203. Rule 1.16 addresses declining or terminating representation. Rule 1.16(a)(l)
provides:
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or,
where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the represen-
tation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of profes-
sional conduct or other law.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(a)(1) (1992).
204. Id. at Rule 1.9(a). For a history of the judicial interpretation of Rule 1.9. see
generally, Steven H. Goldberg, The Former Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move
in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 227, 231-59 (1987) (arguing that the
Rule leads to incompatible results and does not advance the adversary system).
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son in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's
interests are materially adverse.., unless the former client consents after
consultation[,]" ' 5 to make it inapplicable where the representation of
another person is solely in the capacity as guardian/conservator.
Another possible solution is to set up a special or provisional guardian
for this one issue causing the conflict. The real problem to be avoided in
such a situation is L's misuse of confidential information. This risk
should be disclosed to all possible clients before L becomes guardian.
Everyone involved, especially H, should be aware of all the potential
ramifications of L's appointment as fiduciary. Another protective mea-
sure would be to have H sign a letter of intent regarding the scope of the
appointment. It may be a good idea also to have clients name an alter-
nate provisional guardian in the event of conflicts of interest. The provi-
sional guardian could assume L's obligations when L's conflicts of
interest would prohibit her from carrying out her fiduciary duties.20 6
c. Hypothetical III
Assume L's fiduciary appointment is as executor and (1) although the
estate has multiple beneficiaries, L has not otherwise represented the tes-
tator or any of the beneficiaries; or (2) L has previously represented the
testator, but not any of the beneficiaries; or (3) L has previously repre-
sented one or more of the beneficiaries.
In each of these permutations, the basic dilemma is who is the client of
the fiduciary? The estate or the beneficiaries?
Application of the conflict of interest rules depends on whether L's
client is the entity (the estate) or the beneficiary of the estate. Under
Rule 1.7(b), for example, if L is considered to represent each of the bene-
ficiaries (therefore, multiple clients), the representation of each may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibility to another client. How-
ever, one might argue that L is not materially limited because the duty of
a fiduciary is to represent all of the beneficiaries fairly. Furthermore, L
would also be bound by fiduciary law and malpractice safeguards.
One might also argue that the Model Rules do not apply when L is
205. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9 (1992).
206. Another way to provide for the scope of the lawyer's duties while serving solely as
fiduciary may be to expand Rule 1.2 which provides in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and shall consult
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.
(c) A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client con-
sents after consultation.
Id. at Rule 1.2.
The Comment to Rule 1.2 states that the "client has ultimate authority to determine
the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and
the lawyer's professional obligations." Id. at Rule 1.2 cmt.
While the lawyer serving as fiduciary may or may not also be engaged in legal represen-
tation, this rule suggests that the lawyer and client may agree to the parameters of their
relationship so long as no violations of the law or professional rules occur.
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serving only as a fiduciary. Nonetheless, as noted above, the courts tend
to consider a lawyer-even when not acting as a lawyer-to be bound by
the rules of ethical conduct.
One way to clarify such a situation would be to amend Rule 1.7 (and
its comment) to provide that for purposes of the Model Rules, when a
lawyer is a fiduciary for an estate, the lawyer/fiduciary represents the
estate, including all of its beneficiaries.20 7 This would eliminate the pos-
sible application of Rules 1.7(b) and 1.9. That is, amend the comment to
show that Rule 1.7(b) should not apply when the client is actually all the
beneficiaries.
d. Hypothetical IV
Assume that L is named the trustee of a trust, and is also a beneficiary
of the trust, and L has not and does not serve as lawyer for any of the
parties. The issue is whether the conflict of interest provisions of the
Model Rules should apply because the lawyer is serving only as the fidu-
ciary and not in her capacity as lawyer. According to one commentator,
"[t]he Model Rules do not expressly address the question of whether
they would apply to a... fiduciary who was licensed to practice law but
was holding himself out as a ... fiduciary and not as a lawyer."2 8
Several commentators advocate application of the Model Rules for
lawyers in all professional assignments in the belief that a lawyer is a
fiduciary at all times.2'9 Thus, assuming that the conflict rules do apply,
what affect would they have on this situation? Rule 1.7(b) provides that
207. The Comment to Rule 1.7 provides:
Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration.
A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such
as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of inter-
est may arise. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear
under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the
fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or trust, including its bene-
ficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties involved.
Id at Rule 1.9 cmt.
208. Link, supra note 38, at 7 n.12.
209. See generally deFuria, supra note 59 (advocating more stringent application of the
Model Rules for an attorney who drafts a will that names herself as a testamentary fiduci-
ary); Laurino, supra note 68 (addressing the legal and ethical problems arising when an
attorney is named executor in a will she drafts and thereafter acts as a fiduciary).
While a lawyer serving as fiduciary should expect to be held to professional standards
of conduct, it is not clear that a lawyer acting as an executor or trustee is subject to
federal or state regulation. According to William D. Haught:
One federal agency possibly having regulatory authority is the Securities and
Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. While
there is an exemption from that Act for an attorney providing investment ad-
vice and services which are "solely incidental to the practice of his profession,"
the SEC position appears to be that attorneys acting as private fiduciaries may
have stepped beyond the scope of the "lawyer's exemption." Attorneys who
provide no investment advice incidental to those services, but instead engage
outside investment advice and services, are probably outside the ambit of the
Act. The SEC considers that acting as a fiduciary may not be incidental to the
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a lawyer shall not represent a client (here, the trust, or other benefi-
ciaries) if representation may be limited materially by the lawyer's own
interests, unless all parties agree after consultation.21 ° Irrespective of
whether the entity, or the beneficiaries, are considered the client, the law-
yer's own interests as a beneficiary might create a conflict at some point
requiring L either to decline the appointment at the outset, or to later
withdraw if a conflict arises.
Rule 2.1 would apply in this situation because the lawyer/fiduciary
might be unable to render candid advice or exercise independent judg-
ment on behalf of the interests of the entity, or all of the beneficiaries.21" '
But application of this rule assumes that the lawyer cannot shed the role
of lawyer even though acting solely as fiduciary.
Should there then be any changes in the Model Rules to accommodate
the lawyer serving as fiduciary in such a situation? The comment to Rule
1.7 says that "[a] possible conflict does not itself preclude the representa-
tion," and suggests there is a problem only when L cannot consider or
recommend appropriate action for a client because of a conflict. 2 ' 2 Be-
cause of the inherent risks involved whenever a lawyer/fiduciary is a ben-
eficiary, should we prohibit L's service as fiduciary in all cases? No.
There is no reason why the rules here should be any more restrictive than
they are when the lawyer is acting as lawyer.21 3 It is probably preferable,
however, to have the existing conflicts rules apply.
2. Application of the Model Rules Affecting Confidentiality When
the Lawyer Serves as Fiduciary
A common problem arising out of a conflict of interest concerns the
issue of confidentiality.21 4 If there are multiple clients, either simultane-
practice of law, depending on the circumstances of the lawyer's engagement and
the scope of his fiduciary activities.
Haught, supra note 41, at 14.
210. The Comment to Rule 1.7 discusses lawyer's interests as follows: "The lawyer's
own interest should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a
client.... If the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question,
it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice." Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 cmt. (1992).
211. Rule 2.1 addresses the lawyer as advisor as follows: "In representing a client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice." Id.
at Rule 2.1.
212. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 cmt. (1992).
213. See supra part III.B.3.b.
214. Avery suggests that confidentiality in the estate planning process is by necessity
very different from the need of confidentiality in litigation:
In the estate planning process, there is a need for less confidentiality and more
sharing, because the process deals with future consequences of present decisions
and deals with contingencies arising in the future. The litigation process deals
with what occurred; the estate planning process deals with what might occur.
In assisting in the estate planning process, the lawyer should be helping in the
information-sharing process. The lawyer should not be pressing for confidenti-
ality and preservation of secrets. The lawyer should be helping develop care
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ously or successively, how much can the lawyer reveal to the other con-
cerned parties? Furthermore, is the lawyer serving as fiduciary bound by
the same rules of confidentiality?
When the lawyer serves as a fiduciary, her common law duty of loyalty
includes the duty not to disclose information acquired as fiduciary at
least where disclosure would be detrimental to the interests of the benefi-
ciaries, or to those of the principal.2"' Rule 1.6 states that a lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the
client consents after consultation. But the question here is whether, and
under what circumstances, a lawyer/fiduciary can act on confidential in-
formation that is not disclosed?
For example, L has for many years been the lawyer for X, now incom-
petent, and X needs a conservator of the person/estate appointed.21 6 If L
is appointed conservator, Rule 1.6 applies to information acquired by L
when acting as X's lawyer, since according to the comment of that rule,
the duty of confidentiality continues after the lawyer/client relationship
is terminated.2"7 Of course, as conservator, L can and should act with
the benefit of information acquired while X's lawyer and in X's best
interests.
Consider another scenario. L has represented X as a lawyer for many
years, and now is appointed trustee of a trust created by X. Under one
alternative situation, L has not, and does not now represent any of the
trust beneficiaries. Thus, Rule 1.6 would apply to information acquired
from X while acting as X's lawyer; and L may not reveal that informa-
tion except as authorized by Rule 1.6. Can L, nonetheless, act on that
information? Providing that L acts in the best interests of all the benefi-
ciaries and exercises independent judgment, she probably can act on the
information acquired.
An alternative situation would arise if L has, or does, also represent as
lawyer, one or more of the trust beneficiaries. Rule 1.6 would apply to
information L acquired from X and also from the represented benefi-
systems, systems for caring for the surviving spouse, systems for caring for
needy relatives, systems for dealing with unexpected emergencies, and systems
for dealing with persons who may have potential conflicts among each other
and with the client for whom the estate planning is being done.
Avery, supra note 48, at 12.
215. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 cmt. s (1959) ("The trustee is under a
duty to the beneficiary not to disclose to a third person information which he has ac-
quired as trustee where he should know that the effect of such disclosure would be detri-
mental to the interest of the beneficiary.").
216. The key issue of if, and to whom, L may disclose X's incompetence and seek
appointment of a conservator, is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, there may
be a need to either clarify or expand Rule 1.14 to allow the lawyer, under specific circum-
stances, to assume the role of guardian/conservator.
217. The Comment to Rule 1.6 provides: "The duty of confidentiality continues after
the client-lawyer relationship has terminated." Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.6 cmt. (1992).
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ciaries; and L may not reveal the information except as authorized in
Rule 1.6.
Can L act on the information? For example, information learned
while representing beneficiary ("B") led L to conclude that B is a no
good spendthrift and as trustee L has broad discretion to distribute or
accumulate income.
Rules 1.7(b), 1.9, and 2.1 are applicable here and might force the law-
yer to withdraw both as lawyer for the beneficiary, and as fiduciary, un-
less the beneficiary consents to her use of the information. It is debatable
whether it is appropriate to recommend that the Model Rules be changed
to allow L to continue to serve as trustee. Arguably, because L can act to
B's detriment on the basis of information acquired while representing B,
the rules should not be changed. A better solution is for L to resign as
the trustee.
Alternatively, the rules could be expanded to allow for a special or
provisional fiduciary to take the place of the original fiduciary only in
dealing with the specific issue causing the conflict. This would allow the
fiduciary to be "screened" from the situation for which she has detrimen-
tal information regarding B.
3. Application of Rule 2.2 Intermediary Provisions When the Lawyer
Serves as a Fiduciary
Typically, a fiduciary trustee or personal representative is not a media-
tor between parties, but is instead an independent decision maker who, in
making decisions, keeps the best interests of all the beneficiaries in mind.
Nonetheless, cases where the need for mediation could develop include:
I. The will or trust requires all of the beneficiaries to agree, for exam-
ple, regarding the division, or sale, of some property, and they in fact
disagree;
II. After the fiduciary makes a decision, one or more of the benefi-
ciaries is dissatisfied with the decision.
Case I seems an appropriate matter for the lawyer/fiduciary to medi-
ate, subject to the safeguards of Rule 2.2. Rule 2.2 refers to the lawyer as
intermediary and had no counterpart in the Model Code. The rule al-
lows a lawyer to represent multiple parties simultaneously when the cli-
ents' interests are substantially, though not entirely compatible.218
218. According to Rule 2.2:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients [after meeting three con-
ditions]: (1) the lawyer [must] consult[ ] with each client concerning the impli-
cations of the common representation, including the advantages and risks
involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and obtain[ ] each cli-
ent's consent to the common representation; (2) The lawyer [must] reasonably
believe[ ] that the matter can be resolved on terms compatible with the clients'
best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately informed deci-
sions in the matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the inter-
est of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and (3)
the lawyer [must] reasonably believe[ ] that the common representation can be
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Case II, however, does not seem appropriate for mediation; the fiduci-
ary is not disinterested because she made the decision to which the bene-
ficiary objects and could be sued for breach of fiduciary duty if the
mediation is unsuccessful. In fact, perhaps the requirement in Rule
2.2(a)(3) that the lawyer reasonably believes that the common represen-
tation can be undertaken impartially cannot be met in case II.
If there is a need for mediation, for example, as in case I above, it
would seem that the requirements/safeguards of Rule 2.2(a) and (b) are
desirable and appropriate where the lawyer/fiduciary can mediate. Sup-
pose in case II, however, that the lawyer does, or has, represented one of
the beneficiaries as lawyer in other matters. In that case, either because
the lawyer has confidential information that she could use to the better-
ment or detriment of that client's position, or because of general conflict
of interest problems, the lawyer/fiduciary should not intermediate. In
fact, it would seem that Rule 2.2(a)(2) and/or (3) would prevent the law-
yer/fiduciary from intermediating.
In a case that is a proper one for mediation by the lawyer/fiduciary
(e.g., case I), any party can later force the withdrawal of the fiduciary as
mediator under Rule 2.2(c), and the rule may also require the lawyer/
fiduciary to resign as fiduciary. Because withdrawal from the mediation
should not require in many situations the lawyer/fiduciary to resign as
the fiduciary, Rule 2.2(c) should be amended to include that when a law-
yer serving as fiduciary withdraws from a mediation, that withdrawal
does not itself affect her capacity to continue as the fiduciary.
The conflicts of interest Rules 1.7 and 1.9 necessarily imply considera-
tion of the rules of confidentiality and mediation as well. In the context
of the lawyer serving solely as fiduciary, the Model Rules fail to address
the conflict of interest, confidentiality, and mediation problems the law-
yer as fiduciary faces. While the rules provide guidelines, further clarifi-
cations or amendments regarding the role of lawyers as fiduciaries would
be helpful. This is particularly so because lawyers serving solely in a
fiduciary capacity apparently will still be bound by the rules of ethical
conduct because they are considered to be functioning in their profes-
sional capacity.
CONCLUSION
The ethical and legal regulations governing lawyers serving in other
fiduciary roles are not developed fully enough to provide adequate guide-
lines to lawyers functioning in those roles. Lawyers need clearer guide-
lines to help them serve their clients as fiduciaries. This need is crucial in
undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the
lawyer has to any of the clients.
Id at Rule 2.2(a). If any of these conditions is no longer satisfied, then the "lawyer shall
withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so request.... Upon withdrawal, the
lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject
of the intermediation." Id at Rule 2.2(c).
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light of the tendency by the courts to assume that both the standards of
professional ethics and fiduciary law are applicable to a lawyer serving as
fiduciary, whether or not she is also serving as a lawyer. We have sug-
gested here several possible amendments to the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct to help lawyer/fiduciaries better protect themselves and
their clients.
